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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in Energy Systems at the Interna-
tional Hellenic University. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a brief survey on the 
impacts of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) on electricity in-
vestments and prices with greater focus on wholesale and retail prices. 
About the half of the dissertation is involved with important findings of the literature 
review about the impact of EU ETS on electricity investments and prices. Then, the lib-
eralization process in the European electricity sector is discussed and issues about the 
interconnection between competitiveness and EU ETS are addressed. The main trading 
methods in energy market in which carbon emissions rights and related products are 
traded, follows. Additionally, information and characteristics of wholesale electricity 
market, in which the carbon emissions rights are traded, are elaborated. Furthermore, 
some important characteristics of the retail electricity market are discussed, accompa-
nied with the impact of EU ETS on retail prices and why it is different from the impact 
on wholesale prices. Finally, is exhibited the effectiveness of price increases due to 
emissions trading scheme and some findings about the impact of EU ETS on energy 
sector investments. 
Georgios Dandanidis 
21/10/2011 
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1 Introduction 
In the present chapter, a general background and the fundamentals of EU ETS are 
illustrated. Then, a short structure and the objectives of the thesis are presented. 
1.1 Background of emissions trading 
In the modern world, CO2 emissions are generally considered a major factor to-
wards climate change. Carbon dioxide is generated every time fossil fuels like lignite, 
oil and natural gas are burned. In order to reduce their harmful effects, CO2 emissions 
have to be limited. However, tackling CO2 emissions is a very difficult matter, especially 
when you consider the theory of the “Tragedy of the Commons”, written by Garrett 
Hardin and first published in the journal Science in 1968. This theory existed already 
for thousands of years. Aristotle is quoted as saying “For that which is common to the 
greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it”. The tragedy of the commons is 
a dilemma arising from the situation in which multiple individuals, acting independent-
ly and rationally consulting their own self-interest, will ultimately deplete a shared lim-
ited resource, even when it is clear that it is not in anyone's long-term interest for this 
to happen [44]. 
In our case, commons is the atmosphere which is shared by all the people on Earth. 
The tragedy lies behind that the individual cost to pollute is shared with all the com-
munities but in the meantime, the profits are for a particular person. The spoiling of 
the environment has a cost which is called “external cost”. The whole costs are put on 
community, although they are not contained in the decision to begin or continue the 
spoiling activity. 
European Union has adopted the “trading emission rights” as a policy to cope with 
the increasing problem of carbon dioxide emissions. 
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1.2 General Background 
In a world with growing awareness of global warming, the European Union (EU) 
decided, together with other nations, to take action. By ratifying the Kyoto protocol, the 
EU committed to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 8% compared to 1990 
levels in the period 2008-2012. Through the EU burden sharing agreement, each Mem-
ber State has a differentiated GHG emission reduction target. Many industrialized coun-
tries have ratified the Kyoto protocol. Unfortunately, two important and big countries 
haven’t validated the Kyoto Protocol; US and Australia. Counties that are developing 
have no limitations in GHG emissions, but they can redound through Kyoto flexible 
mechanisms [5]. The Kyoto flexible mechanisms are elaborated in the next section. 
In an effort to accomplish its Kyoto target, EU established the European Union 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). European Union Allowances (EUAs), which repre-
sent the right to emit one ton of CO2 in the atmosphere, are traded under this scheme.  
The EU ETS is a cap and trade system. A cap-and-trade system constrains the ag-
gregate emissions of regulated sources by creating a limited number of tradable emis-
sion allowances, which emission sources must secure and surrender in number equal 
to their emissions [46]. Because of the cap, shortage of allowances is created and as a 
result this scarcity of allowances sets the price of emissions in the marketplace. Enti-
ties now face a critical choice with every unit of emissions they produce. Should they 
purchase emissions allowances from other participants in the market or should they 
find ways to reduce emissions by implementing changes in their operations? 
After the EU ETS started to operate in 2005, allowance prices were considerable 
volatile. In the beginning the market appeared to operate without obstructions, and 
while prices for EUAs remained around 26€/tCO2 from January until the end of April 
2006, an unexpected event came in April 2006 when some of the Member States an-
nounced much less carbon emissions for 2005 than anticipated (Source: Point Carbon).  
According to the Scheme prohibitions, after the end of each calendar year, each in-
stallation has to report its actual emissions from that year, assure independent verifi-
cation of this report and submit it to the competent national authority by 31 March. By 
30 April, the company has to surrender a number of emission allowances equivalent to 
its verified emissions in the previous year. Companies that surrender an insufficient 
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number of allowances to cover their emissions have to pay a financial penalty of €40 to 
the Member State concerned for each missing allowance (European Commission). 
Because of the above prohibition of EU ETS, the outcome of the first verified emis-
sions data for installations was a big crash of EUAs price by approximately 20 euro in a 
few days. After this, within some months it became apparent that the real emissions in 
the first trading period would be lower than the suggested cap. In the end of 2006, the 
price of EUAs reached only seven euro and in the end of 2007 the average price was 
less than one euro. Although, there was apparently a market breakdown in the first 
trading period, trading in EUAs for the second trading period (2008-2012) seems to 
function, despite the occurrence of certain peculiarities [47]. 
The price of electricity is determined by the cost of fossil fuels, the impact of envi-
ronmental policies, and climatic factors such as temperature and rainfall. Economic 
theory suggests that the carbon price is a marginal cost and that the opportunity cost 
of the carbon permit equals its market price. As such, the carbon price should be re-
flected in the price of electricity. Empirically, the sharp fall in the price of CO2 of about 
10€/t in April 2006 which was immediately followed by a fall of 5 to 10€/MWh on the 
electricity market (Reinaud, 2007), and the English company British Energy losing 5% of 
its market capitalization over three days in the same period (Bunn and Fezzi, 2007), 
suggest a link between the carbon and electricity markets [8]. Because of that, it raises 
the question if and to what extend the power generators have actually passed through 
the costs of CO2 allowances to electricity prices, and to what degree the increase in 
these prices can be also ascribed to additional factors or only to pass-through. 
Moreover it has raised questions on whether and to what level the assumed pass-
ing through of these costs has led to the phenomenon called “windfall profits”, which 
creates distortions that expand the profits of particular operators in the market. “Point 
Carbon” defines a “windfall profit” as accruing to thermal power generation if the ad-
ditional revenue earned from the pass-through of CO2 (opportunity) costs to power 
prices exceeds the level of compliance costs incurred under that scheme by thermal 
generators. Also, power producers in liberalized electricity markets are clearly obliged 
to demonstrate a competitive behavior and in the meantime try to maximize their 
earnings by adjusting electricity prices in correlation with the marginal costs. Because 
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of the establishment of EU ETS, marginal costs incorporated the opportunity costs of 
allocations, despite the fact that these allocations are granted for free. 
Indeed, companies can either use these allowances to cover the emissions result-
ing from the production processes at these installations or sell them to other compa-
nies that need additional allowances. Hence, for a company using an emission allow-
ance, this represents an opportunity cost, regardless of whether the allowances are 
allocated for free or purchased at auction or the market. According to economists, a 
company will add the costs of CO2 emission allowances to its other marginal (variable) 
costs when making (short-term) production decisions, even if the allowances are 
granted for free. In theory, at least, the free allocation of emissions allowances results 
in large economic rent to firms. In addition, economists advocate distributing allow-
ances for free to fossil-fuel power plants bring about significant misrepresentations of 
the market in behalf of fossil-fuel power plants. Thus, when coal installations receive 
more allocations than gas installations, the investment choice lean towards coal gen-
eration [48]. 
At last, EU ETS has caused higher power prices and profits for the producers. So, 
there are concerns how it will affect international competitiveness of the most power-
intensive companies, the electricity prices for the low power intensive users such as 
the households and finally how the economic surplus will be shared to producers and 
consumers. Due to that, in many European countries policy makers and stakeholders 
of industrial or other interest groups are trying to minimize all these effects by propos-
ing a number of solutions. Some of them are the ameliorating in general of all the EU 
ETS system (notably increasing the share of auctioning), the close supervision of the 
market prices of either EU carbon allowances, electricity or both and imposing tariffs in 
windfall profits [49]. 
1.3 The fundamentals of the EU ETS 
The EU established the European Trading Scheme (ETS) which is the first and big-
gest international scheme for the trading of greenhouse gas emission allowances and 
covers about 12,000 power stations and industrial plants in 30 countries. These instal-
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lations are responsible for almost 45% of carbon dioxide emissions of the EU. EU ETS is 
divided in three trading periods: 
1. The first trading period from 2005 to 2007, was presented as a “warm-up peri-
od so as to put the foundation of the permits trading policy. 
2. The second trading period runs at the same time with the Kyoto period and co-
vers 2008-2012. 
3. The third trading period starts from 2013 and ends in 2020. Almost all the 
emission allowances in this period will be auctioned. 
The allocation of emission allowances is a very important and controversial matter 
in the designing of ETS. There are three methods that allowance are allocated; with 
criteria exogenous for firms receiving the permits, output-based allocation and auction 
[31]: 
1. There are two exogenous criteria that are usually applied; grandfathering and 
benchmarking. In the first one historical data of emissions is used to distribute 
freely the allowances and in the benchmarking allowances are granted based 
upon the ratio of historical production. The drawback is that the new members 
in the market are committed to purchase their permits from existing sources 
and a company does not stop to get permits even thought a plant is not work-
ing. 
2. The second method is the output-based allocation in which the companies re-
ceive a number of permits equivalent to their current production.  
3. In the auction method, the permits are distributed starting from the highest 
bidders. Auctioning allocation is considered as the best method of all with 
many benefits. 
One restriction of the scheme is that the banking of allowances from one period to 
another is not permitted. In the pilot period, almost all the allowances have been dis-
tributed for free. According to the European Directive (2003/87/EC), as regard the se-
cond period, at least the 90% of the allowances will be grandfathered.  
After EU ETS came into force in 2005, for the two first periods, each EU Member 
State decides via the NAP and the EU approves the number of emission allowances 
(EUAs) the Member State will issue and distribute. EUAs permit the holder to emit the 
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equivalent of one tonne of CO2. EU ETS is following about the same archetype as emis-
sions trading under Kyoto protocol. The main target is to ensure reductions in emis-
sions having the minimum possible total cost. Thus, EU ETS tries to embolden the dirti-
est installations to decrease their carbon emissions and invest in clean technologies. 
This depends on a clear, long-standing legal framework and the proper carbon price 
signal to convince the operators of the installations that participate in the scheme, to 
make long-run investments and diminish their emissions. Firms that keep their emis-
sion levels below their allotted number of allowances may sell their surplus permits to 
other firms or use them to offset excess emissions in other parts of their facilities [45].  
EUAs can be transferred easily and each participant may independently select how 
to decrease his emissions or buy extra allowances. Participants have also the ability to 
purchase carbon allowances through the two Kyoto mechanisms; the Joint Implemen-
tation (JI) which produce Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) which produces Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). Both JI and 
CDM offer operators in the EU ETS the opportunity to purchase carbon allowances 
from projects that offer carbon savings over traditional methods. “JI enables industrial-
ized countries to carry out joint implementation projects with other developed coun-
tries, while the CDM involves investment in sustainable development projects that re-
duce emissions in developing countries” (UNFCCC, 2011). Accordingly, participants 
have the choice to find out the least expensive method and follow it. Specifically, par-
ticipants have the following choices: 1) buy EUAs, 2) buy CERs or ERUs, 3) invest in JIs 
or CDMs 4) and make technological enhancements to reduce emissions via whatever 
methods are available and economic. This is how the economic theory works; the mar-
ket will determine which emission abatement method is the most economically effi-
cient. 
Finally, there is the National Allocation Plan (NAP), in which the Member States de-
fine how many emission allowances are granted to their installations for the first and 
second trading periods. Only for the third trading period, starting from 2013, there will 
be no need for NAPs because the allocations will be determined directly by EU. Every 
NAP has to be accepted by the European Commission. 
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1.4 Objectives and Thesis Structure 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a brief survey on the impact of emissions 
trading on electricity investments and prices with greater focus on wholesale and retail 
prices. 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
 Chapter 2 presents some important findings of the literature review about 
the impact of EU ETS on electricity investments and prices, quoting review 
studies, analyses using empirical data and modeling studies. 
 Chapter 3 addresses the liberalization process in the European electricity 
sector and discusses issues related the competitiveness and EU ETS. In addi-
tion, the liberalization of the electricity market is in interaction with the EU 
ETS and competitiveness which is affected by the emissions trading scheme; 
so this field is also examined. 
 Chapter 4: carbon emissions rights and related products are traded on the 
market and this chapter analyzes the main trading methods which are used. 
 In Chapter 5, are elaborated some important characteristics of wholesale 
electricity market in which the carbon emissions rights are traded; such as 
capacity, generation, consumption, prices, convergence, the concentration 
in generation and are discussed some effects of the EU ETS. 
 Chapter 6: some important characteristics of the retail electricity market 
are elaborated; such as the development of regulated and non-regulated 
electricity prices for end-users, the market structure and the switching 
rates. Also, is discussed the impact of EU ETS on retail prices and why it is 
different from the impact on wholesale prices. 
 Chapter 7: the effectiveness of price increases due to EU ETS and some find-
ings about the impact of ETS on energy sector investments are exhibited. 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with a short review of our results and proposes addi-
tional research in this field. 
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2 Literature review 
This chapter provides a literature review on the impact of the EU ETS on electricity 
investments and prices. Section 2.1 outlines existing studies on the possible impact of 
emission trading on power industry and electricity markets. Also, studies which have 
used real empirical data have been examined, and then are presented some modeling 
studies which have used various models to simulate or estimate the effects of the EU 
ETS on different fields in specific countries. In the end, Section 2.2 provides a summary 
of all studies and makes general conclusions. 
2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 Review Studies and Studies Using Empirical Data 
Two review studies that have been examined, one from “Li and Yu (2010)” and one 
from “Binbin Xun, Fushuan Wen and Iain MacGill (2009)” follows. 
Li & Yu (2010) 
The focus on this paper [1] is given upon the features of ETS and how it impacts on 
the three interactive markets, which are the Electricity Market, Carbon Market and 
Renewable Market. Li & Yu also stresses that all Genco (Generation Companies) prob-
ably will pass the whole cost of emissions allowances, if not more, to the end users by 
adding it to their short-run marginal cost. Additionally, he analyses how allowances are 
distributed and summarizes the impacts of each method. 
How allowances are allocated 
There are many studies supporting different methods of allocating, but paper [1] 
considers auction or mix allocation including auction better than the rest of the meth-
ods. In the short-run, distributing permits for free will not help in the decreasing of 
carbon emissions and do not induce investments in new technology. Furthermore, 
grandfathering will probably create prejudice towards new companies joining the mar-
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ket, because for the existing companies; the permits are granted for free albeit new 
companies have to buy them. On the other side, in the long-run the free permits will 
adulterate competiveness. Output-based allocation does not have the same applica-
tion; however it is like a subsidy to the product.  
In general, distribution of free emission allowances could result to over remunera-
tion to the entire generation industry. On the other hand, auctioning revenues could 
be used for the public good, such as to fight unemployment, cut pre-existing taxes etc. 
Also auctioning will produce a market clearing price, something that will help all inter-
ested parties to have a price reference. 
Subsequently, the paper divides the impact to electricity prices into two categories’ 
a) impact on wholesale prices and b) impact on retail prices. 
a) The impact on wholesale prices 
Various measures in the environment and energy area are being executed in the 
EU and its Member States. For this reason, many literatures studied their interactive 
influence and the policies. Study [12] is mentioned as an example which shows that 
the efficacy and influence of those measures mainly depends on the demand response 
in the electricity market. In the same paper there is another conclusion that, when the 
support polices or the electricity markets are national, distortion may occur. For in-
stance, when in one country the electricity demand has decreased, possible will be 
subsidized by consumers or taxpayers in another country. 
A lot of research has been done focusing the impacts of ETS in the wholesale elec-
tricity price evolving new and old kinds of simulation models. The numerical example 
of [13] displays that the total cost of generating electricity in the Netherlands is related 
to EUA prices. Particularly when EUA is 10€/tCO2, the total generating cost would in-
crease about 0.41€cent/kWh. Taking into account the gas-based generation (0.42kg 
CO2/kWh), this would result to a higher electricity price in 2010 by 0.42€cent/kWh 
which means about 15% rise of the price because of EU ETS. Paper [9] has concluded 
that in the Nordic region, when the price of allowances is 1€/tCO2, the annual whole-
sale price would increase 0.74€/MWh up to year 2010. 
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A general conclusion is that even though many antagonistic models have been 
used to analyze the short-run effect of the CO2 EA (emission allowances) trading on the 
electricity price, the results present that the effect of pass-through rates mostly de-
pends on the specific electricity market structures.  
Another research [14] after an analysis of the Italian context came into the point 
that the marginal opportunity cost of CO2 EA would be fully internalized in the electric-
ity price regardless the competitiveness of the market. 
b) The impact on retail prices 
One thing that can be done to reduce the impact of ETS on retail prices is to im-
pose numerous constrains on Genco (Generation Company) to transfer the full range 
of the wholesale electricity price to end-users. 
The Impacts on Generation Investment 
Because emitting CO2 has a cost, it produces motive for Genco to invest in new 
generation technology more environmental friendly and at the same time creates a 
CO2 reduction current. In the short-term, ETS will affect dispatching arrangement and 
for the long run will lead to the investing plan. 
In general, EU ETS demands Gencos to obtain allowances to cover their emissions 
and for this reason will influence their plans in two ways. The first is in the short run, 
that will raise the short marginal cost and in the long term, it will turn out to invest-
ments on new capacities in behalf of power facilities at modest permit rates. 
Binbin Xun, Fushuan Wen and Iain MacGill (2009) 
The aim of paper [2] is to review the literature in regard to the possible impact of 
emission trading on power industry and electricity markets. 
Windfall profits are one of the related problems in allowances allocations. The 
electricity sector would take advantage of the EU ETS since the allowances are distrib-
uted for free [23]. These extra profits may rely on the carbon price and few assump-
tions. As an example, at a given price of 20€/tCO2, it has been calculated that windfall 
profits will reach 300-600€ million annually for the generation sector of Netherlands. 
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Towards the limitation of the negative results of the pass-through, caused by the 
opportunity cost of carbon certificates which distributed for free; the next actions 
should be followed. First of all, free allowances allocated to power plants have to be 
reduced drastically by applying a stricter allocation system and therefore larger quanti-
ty of allowances purchased in the emission market, or use auctioning for a number of 
allowances. One more solution is to pay-back the users by 1) allocating the CO2 emis-
sion allowances or 2) recycling the gains from allowances auction to the users [24]. 
Subsequently, the impacts on generation investments are examined. Generation 
cost will rise as a result of emission trading scheme introduction especially for those 
power plants that are using fossil fuels. If carbon allowances form a significant price, 
this will have two major effects in the short term [25]. According to the price elasticity 
of demand, consumers will possibly buy smaller quantities of electricity as the electrici-
ty price will be higher. Moreover, the cost of CO2 allowances will alter the dispatching 
merit order of the power producers. The above changes hinge on the variety of gener-
ation technologies and fuel excess in the neighbor area. Moreover, pricing CO2 emis-
sions promotes investments in new generation - low carbon - technology particularly 
for the period prior the new technology become familiar and is spread out on a great 
scale [25]. 
According to [20] a switch from coal-fired to gas-fired electricity production can 
become true if some prerequisites are fulfilled. To begin with, economic incentives 
play a key role and two of them are the high enough carbon allowance price, in con-
junction with low natural gas price. One more important factor is the existence of suf-
ficient number of CCGT power plans for switching. Another interesting point showed in 
the paper is that the uncertainties come from the allocation of emission allowances is 
vital if the thermal power plants will decide to switch to natural gas. 
In order to maximize the expected earnings, a generation company has the next 
choices: 
 "Investment to emission control technology and instruments. 
 Purchasing the permits from an emission trading market. 
 Reducing the electricity production so as to decrease the emissions. 
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 Mothballing the plants and selling the emission permits, until the price of per-
mits decreases. 
 Changing the fuel, and substituting the coal-fired units with CCGT or other low-
carbon emission units. 
 Retire. [2]" 
New entrants in the power sector will consider investing in new generation tech-
nologies because of the emission trading scheme. On the other hand, having in mind 
that a life-period for a power plant is 20-30 years, new entrants have available only 
short-term market information, something that comes from the specifications of ETS, 
and produce many uncertain factors. For that reason, a longer term ETS policy has to 
been set to encourage investing in new technologies. 
Renewable energy, for example biopower, will take advantage of ETS which may 
result to the rise of electricity price that comes from power plants using conventional 
fuels, and therefore make more competitive the biopower. To make this clear, assum-
ing a carbon certificate price around 10€/tCO2, the electricity price in German and 
Nordpool electricity markets will end up more expensive for about 3-8€/MWh. So, the 
investors will judge if investing on GHG reduction mechanisms or on biopower will be 
more profitable, having of course in mind some other factors such as the electricity 
supply and demand curve. Another very valuable RES is wind energy; CO2 price has to 
be really high, near 40€/tCO2 to provide incentives for wind energy investments [26]. 
The wholesale electricity price is defined by numerous factors including market and 
non-market ones. Without doubt, the ETS could affect the wholesale electricity price, 
and the degree of this affect will rely on several features [16], [24], [29]: 
 "The CO2 intensity of the electricity generation. The carbon intensity of the fuel 
at the margin is the primary factor to analyze the carbon intensity of a country. 
 Competition in the market or the intensity of competition, along with the 
chance that higher price will be acceptable by regulators or politicians. 
 Current CO2 price levels. If the CO2 price is very high, it will significantly impact 
on new entrants. 
 The rate of passing through carbon cost. The higher the rates, the higher the 
wholesale price would be. 
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 The flexibility of generation. Technical factors such as ramp rates, dispatch abil-
ity, age of the plant and the type of turbines limit opportunities for arbitrage 
between the CO2 market and electricity markets. 
 The price elasticity of demand – and the options available for energy intensive 
users to mitigate or avoid the increase in the electricity price. 
 The network structure. The structure of the network limits the transmission ca-
pacity to some extent. This gives rise to congestion, and so some generation 
companies could use their market power to increase the wholesale price. [2]" 
Many literatures have analyzed the impacts of EU ETS upon the wholesale electrici-
ty price and to do this many simulation models was created. In [27] was concluded 
that an allowance price of 5€/tCO2 results in a 6.5% expansion of electricity price and 
an allowance price of 20€/tCO2 to approximately 24% expansion [27]. Depending on 
the local electricity market, around 35% to 65% of the opportunity cost would be 
transferred on the wholesale electricity price, and as a consequence the price will 
climb about 5-9€/MWh [16].  
In another paper [28] is pointed that in an ideally antagonistic market, the marginal 
opportunity cost of carbon emission allowances will be entirely passed on the electrici-
ty price. Also illustrates that the influence of pass-through rates is mostly depended 
from the characteristics of the specific electricity market. 
To sum up, this article made a short review as regard the effects of the ETS on the 
power sector and the electricity market, focusing on the impacts on production in-
vestments, renewable energy growth and electricity prices. Furthermore, is mentioned 
that auctioning is the most accepted method because of its efficient, especially when it 
is compared with free allocation which seems to be more unfair. The trend supports 
auctioning, although grandfathering is more realistic choice for the first stage of ETS. 
Speaking about the short term impacts, one of them is the alter of the merit order dis-
patching in the electricity market and in the long term, power plants will focus more to 
low emission technology such as renewable energy production. Last but not least, is 
the appearing increase of electricity prices which will mainly hinge on the permits price 
and the pass through rates. 
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The review of studies which have used real empirical data follows. In chronological 
order, the studies are from “Claudia Kettner, Angela Köppl and Stefan Schleicher 
(2010)”, “Julien Chevallier (2010)” and “Wagner (2009)”. 
Claudia Kettner, Angela Köppl and Stefan Schleicher (2010) 
Working paper [4] focus on the first trading period (2005-2007) of the EU ETS and 
found that because of the important over-allocation of emissions allowances and the 
loose emissions cap policy, carbon prices dropped suddenly. As a result, low prices 
caused very few investments in new technology for the rest of the period.  Although, in 
2008 the policy was stricter, the price volatility continued to be high. 
The EU ETS after the Kyoto period (2013-2020) will have major changes such as an 
EU-wide cap and an auctioning system. All these different approaches have as a root 
the experience gained in the first period of the EU ETS. On the contrary to the first 
year’s evidence of price volatility, no measures are foreseen for the following years to 
ensure the price immutability and promote investment decisions. 
From EU commission guidelines, is obvious that they didn’t anticipate important al-
location differences between the European countries; a hypothesis that this paper re-
jected for the very first trading years and surprisingly for 2008 discrepancies expanded. 
The empirical data used for the analysis was taken from Community Independent 
Transaction Log (CITL) which is the European registry about the verified emissions and 
distributed allowances of facilities. National Allocation Plans were also used as a data 
source. The analysis is concentrated on the first trading period (2005-2007) and the 
first year of the second period (2008); and it involves data for 24 EU member states. 
Figure 2.1 exhibits the short and long positions by country for years 2005-2007 and 
makes clear that the market in total was in a net long position. The mean annual dis-
tributed emissions were 2,145 million tonnes, however only 2,077 million tonnes were 
verified. In the whole trading period on average the market was long with 69 million 
tonnes of emission allowances match to 3.2% of distributed allowances. In the same 
figure the distribution declination between the member states is more than obvious. 
Only five countries were in a short position having the UK leading with 36 million 
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tonnes, and the rest 19 countries were in long position but Poland had the absolute 
net long score with 30 million tonnes. 
Buchner and Ellerman (2008) examined ETS trading years 2005 and 2006 and after 
analyzing economic activity (includes the volume index of production of the following 
sectors: pulp and paper, cement, total industry, glass-bricks-tiles-ceramics, iron and 
steel, production and distribution of electricity), carbon and energy intensity, end up 
that in general the EU long position came from reduction actions of 130 to 220 million 
tonnes annually and of a yearly over-allocation of up to 125 million tonnes. Long posi-
tion is a market position in which the investor has purchased a financial instrument 
(stock, commodity, currency, emissions allowances etc.) that he or she did not previ-
ously own, with the expectation of an increase in value (www.finweb.com). 
 
Figure 2.1: Short and long positions by Member States (mean values for 2005-2007). 
Source: CITL (2009); calculations from the authors’ of paper *4+. 
For 2008 the results changed as Figure 2.2 shows. The allocated emissions were 
1,902 million tonnes and the verified were 2,050 tonnes. Consequently, the market 
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was in a net short position of 148 million tonnes or 7.8%. In the years 2005-2007 five 
countries showed a net short position but for 2008 this number raise up to 14.  
 
Figure 2.2: Short and long positions by Member States (2008). 
Source: CITL (2009); calculations from the authors’ of paper *4+. 
Combining Figure 2.1 and 2.2 exhibit that the allocation declination between the 
first and second trading period changed dramatically. Countries in the Baltic Area 
(Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) which in the introduction of EU ETS showed the highest 
net long positions, in 2008 the net position fell for a significant percentage or even al-
ter into a net short position. This evidence demonstrates that these Member States 
dealt with the most serious curtailments in allocation caps in the European review 
about the National Allocation Plan (Capoor and Ambrosi 2008). The highest net short 
position appeared in the United Kingdom which was 17.6% in 2005-2007 and in 2008 
climbed up to 23.8%. Additionally, the paper shows that National Allocation Plans pro-
duced considerable disparities to the allocation positions on a country and on installa-
tion level especially on 2008. 
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From Figures 2.3 and 2.4 it derives that more than 20% of all sectors besides power 
and heat are in long position in the first trading period and in 2008. Power sector is in 
short position and this become more obvious in the Kyoto period (2008). Cement and 
lime long position becomes even higher in 2008. Finally, refineries seem to cope with a 
stricter cap in the first year of the Kyoto period. The short position of the power and 
heat sector may resultant from the connection between wholesale electricity prices 
and emission allowances prices, which can pass through the extra cost across the op-
eration of the market. 
 
Figure 2.3: Short and long positions by sectors (averages 2005-2007). 
Source: CITL (2009); calculations from the authors’ of paper *4+. 
 
Figure 2.4: Short and long positions by sectors (2008). 
Source: CITL (2009); calculations from the authors’ of paper *4+. 
The paper continues the analysis illustrating the evolution of price volatility in EU 
ETS. By the beginning of the ETS, EUA prices present intense volatility. In Figure 2.5 we 
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can observe the evolution of the carbon prices from January 2005 till July 2009. The 
first big rise to €20 in May 2005 came after EU cut the proposed national caps of the 
Czech Republic and Poland by some dozens of million tones. The same happened to 
Italy and combined with the rising of gas and oil prices, carbon price reached €30 in 
July 2005. Then carbon prices declined along with fuel prices. 
After that, the price rose again and reached €35 due to the heavy winter 
(2005/2006) and the more expensive energy. The sharp and big fall of the price hap-
pened when in the end of April 2006 the data on the verified emissions released. Eve-
ryone understood that EU ETS market was long and the price dropped rapidly to €12 
euro. This clarifies that anticipations about verified emissions and therefore prices 
were wrong. In the end of 2006 the carbon prices of the first trading period started to 
fall and in the end of 2007 became zero due to the fact that banking from one period 
to another is forbidden. 
Another considerable point is that the prices for allowances of the second trading 
period reached their pick on July 2008 and then started to decline in consequence of 
the expectations of the companies because of the economic crisis. On February 2009 
carbon prices unexpectedly started to raise slowly something that shows there are 
more factors which drives the carbon prices. 
 
Figure 2.5: EU ETS Over-The-Counter closing prices. 
Source: Point Carbon. 
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There are two main reasons because of which the recorded carbon price may not 
reflect the long-run fundamentals: 
1. "Market prices may lose their credibility in terms of providing signals for long-
term decisions. This has a particular bearing for investment decisions that have 
an impact on the supply and use of energy. 
2. As a consequence this may lead to wrong decisions which create excessive 
costs. [4]" 
Consequently, the structure for the EU ETS in the post-Kyoto period should be re-
vised to protect the carbon market from the market side effects derived from price 
volatility. 
In conclusion, this analysis examines the carbon price volatility which is high since 
2005. The price drivers that caused this volatility are the following: institutional factors 
(such as over-allocation in the first trading period), economic activity, fuel prices and 
last but not least, weather conditions. When the Kyoto period will end, a more strin-
gent cap and smaller institutional insecurity are anticipated because of the precautions 
in the new emissions trading directive. Although, the progression of other factors 
which affects price could probably result price volatility which in consequence will af-
fect decisions for new investments. 
Julien Chevallier (2010) 
Julien Chevallier [6] analyzes the price relationship in EU ETS. Specifically, it anal-
yses how the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects influence the abidance 
within the EU ETS. Figure 2.6 presents the Certified Emission Reduction (CER – are origi-
nated from a CDM project), EUA prices which have about the same trend and point out 
that these markets are correlated. On the bottom, CER-EUA spread is presented and 
evinces the existing arbitrage opportunities for traders. 
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Figure 2.6: EUA, CER, and EUA-CER Spread Prices 
Source: European Climate Exchange 
When the spread is wide, this signifies that the risk premium in the purchase of 
CERs compared to EUAs is high. Additional, it identifies the big arbitrage opportunities 
to use CERs instead of EUAs because they are cheaper. On the contrary, when CER-EUA 
spread is short, means that CERs become infamous. 
The conclusion of the paper is that from a certain point of view, CERs promote in-
vestments in cleaner and new technologies in non-Annex B countries, improving global 
environment; but on the other point of view, the thoughtless use of CERs would result 
to a price floor for EUAs, and lead to lower prices. As a result, EU ETS market does not 
provide the right “price-signal” for carbon emissions, which should be in a certain level 
to stimulate the industries, invest in reducing emissions. 
To reach the most feasible solution according to the EU Commission’s priorities, 
CERs use should be constrained, so as a) to limit design inefficiencies that have spotted 
during the first period of ETS and b) to encourage investments in low-carbon technolo-
gies inside the EU. 
Wagner (2009) 
The author of this paper analyzes the effect of EU ETS carbon prices on CO2 abate-
ment and on power prices. 
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The effect of EU ETS carbon prices on CO2 abatement 
Something that has been misunderstood is how effective is the EU ETS in reducing 
CO2. The answer is that the total cap on emissions is preset and guaranteed during a 
trading period. Whoever does not comply with pays the analogue fine. 
The main drivers of CO2 reduction are the followings: 
1. In short term effects is the fuel switching. 
2. On investment are the investment decisions (for example renewables), CDM 
and JI projects. 
3. In indirect effects there are the effects of CO2 prices on other commodity prices 
and the corporate culture. 
Short term effects 
When in the power sector a spare capacity exist and the combination of CO2 and 
fuel prices point out a profitable opportunity, an old coal plant could be replaced by a 
gas plant. Below is an interesting graph that shows the fuel switch levels for the UK 
from June 2009; and indicate that at the given hard coal/gas price relationship, the 
largest number of coal plants will give their place to new technological gas plants in 
the third quarter of 2009. 
 
Figure 2.7: Fuel switching levels relative to the EUA price [3]. 
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Investment 
The EU emissions trading of carbon dioxide will bring considerable competitive ad-
vantage to carbon-free energy production forms. Spain is a country in which major 
changes happened and led to an electricity production with low carbon intensity. Be-
cause of the significant increase of electrical consumption and the country high growth 
rate, the process of investment in generation led to the authorization of a great num-
ber new CCGT plants with the massive total installed capacity of 21,670 MW; in other 
words the 32% of total demand. 
Moreover, the contribution of wind power output had an important increase the 
last eight years and now covers something more than 10% of the total power demand. 
The outcome of this enormous investment in CCGT and wind power, allowed Spain to 
raise its power production and at the same time reduce CO2 emissions. 
Indirect effects 
Today the CO2 has been linked with a price and the concerns all over the world for 
the effects on the climate, nature and economy have woken up large number of com-
panies who started to take action. For example, E.ON; a company which leads in ener-
gy sector, plant a big decrease on the CO2 intensity of its power generation portfolio. 
More and more companies change their energy mix and invest on zero- and low-
emission technologies to reduce CO2 footprint and become environmental friendly. 
One more indirect effect is the increase in wholesale power prices caused by the fact 
that CO2 adds an extra production factor to power plant operations. 
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Figure 2.8: European Power Forwards Base in carbon constrained and carbon-unconstrained 
environments [3]. 
The above figure shows the development of the Baseload Power Forwards for sev-
eral European countries, four effects are evident: 
1. First of all it is obvious that all over Europe the wholesale power prices have 
increased after the EU ETS came into force in the beginning of 2005. The 
simultaneous decrease of the price in every country in May 2006 after the 
realizing of Verified Emissions, reveal that carbon became a common driver of 
wholesale power prices. 
2. ETS had as a result the convergence of European power markets. 
3. Since the power prices increasing, the new target was to find how to save 
power consumption. Although, increasing power prices have raised carbon 
leakage and industries shift their productions away to regions which don’t have 
the carbon constraints of Europe. 
4. We realize that because of the crisis in 2008-2009 it suddenly became easier to 
reduce emissions and that was good. Unfortunately that also means that 
European business did not invest nearly as much as planned in innovation, 
which could harm the future ability of EU to compete on promising markets. 
The effect of EU ETS carbon prices on power prices 
After the suddenly decline of household power prices in Germany due to the de-
regulation of the EU power markets, we observe that since the establishment of the 
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EU ETS, the retail prices continued to rise but not to accelerate (Figure 2.9). So, the 
trend didn’t change. 
 
Figure 2.9: Retail prices have been influenced in unimportant scale because of CO2-prices [3]. 
 
Figure 2.10: Composition of power tariff (household - Germany) comparatively steady, but 
price increased. 
Figure 2.10 shows that CO2 is not the main price driver for households in Germany 
even though the price increased. On the contrary, the state contributes much more in 
the rise of the price through several new fees and tax ascendants (38.4% in total). 
2.1.2 Modeling Studies 
The review of five representative modeling studies follows. In chronological order, 
the studies are from “Djamel Kirat and Ibrahim Ahamada (2011)”, “Pahlea, M., L. Fanb 
and W-P Schillc (2011)”, “Chappin, E.J.L. and G.P.J. Dijkema (2009)”, “Delarue, E., K. 
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Voorspools, and W. D’haeseleer (2008)”, “Kara, M., S. Syri, S. Helynen, V. Kekkonen, M. 
Ruska and J. Forsström (2008)” and Reinaud, J. (2004). 
Djamel Kirat and Ibrahim Ahamada (2011) 
Paper [8] is an empirical time-series model in which is examined if eventually EU 
ETS provides the proper economic motives to create an efficient system in compliance 
with Kyoto protocol. The focus is given upon two countries; France and Germany. Also 
the prices of different electricity contracts of these two countries are modeled, the 
volatility of the prices is assessed and the connection of the electricity prices of the 
two countries is determined. 
The facts indicate that carbon and electricity markets are connected. The intense 
drop in the price of CO2 of about 10€/t in April 2006 which was followed by 5 to 
10€/MWh on the electricity market (Reinaud, 2007) and the 5% loss of the market cap-
italization of the “British Energy” company during the very same period (Bunn and Fez-
zi, 2007) supports the above statement. 
The following figures present the prices of several electricity contacts on the 
French and German electricity stock exchanges along with the prices of carbon, coal 
and gas. The first impression the figures give, is that the prices of various electricity 
contracts have different variation and that the month-ahead contract prices are much 
less volatile compared to the day-ahead contract prices. 
In April 2006, CO2 price had a sharp drop nearly 15€ in three days, after the an-
nouncement of verified 2005 emissions by European commission, disclosing that al-
lowances in carbon market were more than the actual emissions. Two structural 
breaks have to been addressed; the first one in April 2006, as already noticed, and the 
other one in October 2006, came after the statement that allowances will be cut about 
15% in the second trading period (2008-2012) (Alberola et al., 2008). 
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Figure 2.11: Month-ahead contract electricity prices in France and Germany [8]. 
 
Figure 2.12: Day-ahead contract electricity prices in France and Germany [8]. 
 
Figure 2.13: Carbon, coal and gas prices [8]. 
The general outcome is that the EU ETS had affected in both countries the genera-
tion sector but in different extension. 
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In France more than 80% of the electricity comes from nuclear power plants and is 
cheaper compared with the electricity produced from fossil fuel plants and CO2 emis-
sions are zero. On the other hand Germany is based on fossil fuel power plants (50%) 
which are more expensive and therefore French electricity producers gain more profit 
from their energy mix. In addition, the analysis exhibit the important correlation be-
tween electricity prices in the two countries and that French electricity producers ben-
efit from the French energy mix that we mentioned before, as regard the production 
costs. 
Moreover it derived that because of EU ETS, the relativity between French and 
German wholesale electricity prices raised and the crash of carbon allowance market 
triggered a switch from gas to coal plants in producing electricity in Germany. This 
happens mostly because of the different energy mixes in the two countries. 
The electricity contract price estimation results, which have been extracted from 
the model, are quite interesting and include the period from July 4th 2005 to June 29th 
2007. First of all, they showed that temperatures have no influence to the month-
ahead electricity contract prices, but they affect the day-ahead electricity contract 
prices. Additionally, the German electricity prices change notably day by day, some-
thing which does not happen on the French day-ahead contracts. The results also em-
phasize in how gas and carbon prices affects the electricity price in France and Germa-
ny, and the important different level of affection between the countries. In France for 
example, only gas prices have impact on electricity prices in the long-run balance, 
however the price of carbon in general does not have significant influence. Regarding 
Germany, gas prices are affecting considerable the month-ahead and day-ahead prices 
and carbon prices have a minor affect only in the day-ahead contracts. Finally, gas 
prices influence more electricity prices in Germany than in France as was anticipated, 
due to the different penetration of gas in each country. 
Another highlight is that both German and French day-ahead prices are unstable 
and particularly the second one. Furthermore, though the model was estimated that 
the carbon spot price did assist to specify electricity prices in the period prior the 
breakdown of the carbon spot price on 28th of December 2006. After that, electricity 
prices were not connected with the carbon spot price in 2007. The general outcome is 
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that EU ETS affected electricity prices and so the power sector in Germany and France, 
although in different extend. 
The conclusion of the paper is that EU ETS did not have big success in the pilot 
phase (2005-2007) and forced electricity producers to 1) minimize their CO2 emissions 
and 2) target in cleaner technologies. This ineffectiveness caused because countries 
considers power plants strategic installations; and due to some mechanisms of EU ETS 
such as the prohibition of “banking” surplus CO2 certificates from one trading period 
to another. The latter resulted to block the founding of scarcity, something absolute 
important of carbon compulsion. The above resulted in the collapse of the carbon spot 
price in the end of the first trading period. 
Pahlea, M., L. Fanb and W-P Schillc (2011) 
Additionally, paper *11+ it’s a modeling study which have used a discounted cash 
flow (DCF) model, and is speaking about the effect of emission allowances on invest-
ments in Germany. The criteria that has been selected to assess the total yield in the 
market of the investments options, is the net present value (NPV). In addition, is exam-
ined how the period of free allocation and especially the extension of it, affected in-
vestment decisions. The study emphasizes the widely accepted belief, that free alloca-
tion of ETS certificates produced windfall profits which had a really significant impact 
for “dash for coal”. This turn in high-carbon intensity power plants is particularly ob-
served in Germany. 
German national allocation plans (NAPs) play an important role in this "dash for 
coal" by granting free certificates for new entrants taking into account fuel specific 
benchmarks. In this way, conventional fuels that are "dirtier" such as coal; got more 
allocations than natural gas which is considered "cleaner". The research found that 
NAP I gave more impulsion to the pre-existed favor for coal investments than for natu-
ral gas. Reversely, if allocation rules were different, such as auctioning or a single best 
available technology benchmark, would have total different impact and promote natu-
ral gas investments. 
Laurikka and Koljonen (2006) examined the investment opportunities for gas and 
coal plants in Finland and discover that EU ETS didn’t affect much coal plant invest-
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ments but reduced seriously the earnings of gas plants. However, they could not satis-
fy their results, since they didn’t consider the passed-though opportunity costs and 
windfalls profits. Moreover, on 2007 Bergerson and Lave, concluded that when dis-
count rates and taxation change, this probably have great influence on electricity gen-
eration investments; something which also indicates the current paper. 
In [11] they model the investment decision of a fossil power plant in Germany ex-
amining two different technologies; hard coal and natural gas. Two main characteris-
tics are examined; the net present value and the financial lifetime, in order to distin-
guish which technology is better. In the scenario that carbon regulation does not exist, 
was found that hard coal has a 283€ million greater profit than a natural gas plant. 
Therefore, hard coal would be the most favorable technology in 2005. After the apply-
ing of EU ETS hard coal plan was even more profitable (717€ million) because of the 
windfall profits due to allocation rules. Additionally, in the other case scenario that full 
auctioning (AUC) is applied, plants that use natural gas are more profitable for about 
136€ million. Exactly the same change in NPV comes out in the scenario with the single 
best available technology benchmark (SBAT). Thus, full auctioning would have mean-
ingfully reduced the coal earnings and on the other hand, SBAT would have expanded 
the profitability of coal and gas schemes because of the windfall earnings. 
The results, present that carbon prices influence in great extend the AUC and SBAT 
regimes. To make this clear, when low-level carbon price is assumed, NPV difference of 
hard coal on AUC or SBAT regimes, is 102€ million. Contrariwise, when CO2 price is 
high, the NPV advantage of natural gas over hard coal is 411€ million. That means that 
when carbon prices are going up, natural gas investments in AUC/SBAT model benefit. 
The findings show that the extension of the free allocation period had a serious ef-
fect on the associated financial gains of coal and gas projects. Although, altering of the 
technology selection could not be occur even when presuming a really quick period. In 
other words, the German national allocation plan I, despite the fact that it provided an 
extend period of free allocations, did not have so significant impact as it was consid-
ered. 
The conclusion is that the German NAP I was not responsible for “dash for coal”, 
but stimulated and supported it. Also, due to the institution of full auctioning from 
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2013 and forward through NAP III, Germany will give the properly signals from the en-
vironmental point of view. Unfortunately, the scheduled new coal power plants have 
reduced the expectations for a future with low carbon emissions. 
Chappin, E.J.L. and G.P.J. Dijkema (2009) 
In paper [10], the effect of ETS on power generation emissions is examined, quanti-
fied with an agent-based simulation model and focusing in Netherlands. According to 
[30], electricity demand is rather inelastic to changes in price. Because of that, electric-
ity producers maybe do not proceed in switching to low-carbon technology invest-
ments but decide to incorporate the carbon allowance cost in their price. 
Furthermore, the paper point at the major impact of carbon emission trading (CET) 
which is on investment decisions by electricity generators. The main results from the 
analysis are shown in the following figures. The yearly impact of CET on emissions is 
illustrated in Figure 2.14.  
It appears that the impact in the first twenty years is minor and in some scenarios 
we notice a reduction but the rest of them indicated a significant increase of up to 
25%. After this period in most scenarios, emissions decreased in a great extent and go 
close even to 80% after many years. Of course the absolute emissions increase in the 
most cases, since the whole electricity demand moves upward. 
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Figure 2.14: The average impact of CO2 emission-trading on emissions per year in different 
scenarios [10]. 
In Figure 2.15, the synthesis of the electricity production portfolio over year is ex-
hibited. The continuous lines indicate the developments under the influence of ETS 
and the dotted lines present the developments in a system without the existence of 
emission trading. It comes out that a definite effect of ETS is that the development of 
the synthesis of the electric power production portfolio varies. 
In the first three decades, ETS do not have a significant impact and power plants 
continue to operate till the expiration of their lifetime. At the same time, electricity 
customers start to accept the cost for carbon allowances. Furthermore, for the first 
thirty years, natural gas expansion stops unexpectedly and coal replace it. In the end 
coal share reduces, from 45% to 30% but after all is not eliminated. This shows that 
coal have deep roots and cannot be banned easily. 
 
Figure 2.15: The average impact of CO2 emission-trading on developments in portfolio compo-
sition [10]. 
If carbon policy did not exist, coal would rule the energy sources for electricity pro-
duction. Renewable sources shows an increase trend but not so much that we would 
expected. Assuming that the electricity demand will go really high, coal appears to be 
essential in the portfolio. When carbon prices are low, coal has also low variable cost; 
hence it covers an important portion of the base load and power plants have earnings. 
The above assumptions have as a result to minimize the impacts of ETS and the latter 
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do not succeed to decrease emissions. Nevertheless, having more pragmatic assump-
tions would alter the outcome. 
 
Figure 2.16: Portfolio developments of individual electric power producers [10]. 
The simulation included also six electricity producer agents with unique groups of 
investment decision criteria. In the above figure are displayed the portfolios of three 
electricity producers which on the very beginning were the same. Through time the 
portfolios developed in totally different way, specially the portfolio of the third agent 
which came out to have the largest earnings and at the same time the upper power 
generation capacity. The most important thing is that this power producer use only 
few renewable sources, it is the top carbon emitter and after all has the largest finan-
cial gain. As it seems, emission trading system is not sufficient and do not succeed in 
the goal of the fuel shift. 
In conclusion, the European emission trading system does not have major effect on 
carbon emissions by power generation and its portfolio. Coal in the long-run, because 
it is inexpensive and due to the expansion of electricity needed, it will not be aban-
doned. The scenarios results vary in a great range and so do not mean that one of the 
portfolios came out from the model will occur. The strategy that power generators fol-
low would change and new technological advancements could alter the cost of alter-
native solutions. Coal remains popular since it has grant flexibility as for example the 
choice of co-fire biomass and store and capture of carbon emissions in the future. 
Furthermore, the planning power installations for the next years in countries like 
Netherlands, Germany and UK, are numerous. This means that EU ETS did not change 
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the existed favor for coal and because of that, is not expected any change in the cur-
rent situation due to the long period of generation plant’s life. 
Delarue, E., K. Voorspools, and W. D’haeseleer (2008) 
This study [5], focus on fuel switching and notice the outcome of empirical data, 
which presents that in the beginning of the EU ETS the price of allowances caused  
emission abatement through fuel switching in Europe. Then it continues with an exten-
sive analysis of switching during the first and second trading period, after applying an 
electricity generation simulation model. 
Two conditions must exist for switching to take place; and the first one is the eco-
nomic motive. Switching from coal to gas, fewer emissions are produced and therefore 
less money have to been given for allowances. Hence, the economic incentive is not 
related with how allowances are distributed. The assumption of a 100% allowance cost 
pass through from producer to consumer is assumed (Sijm et al. 2006). 
The existence of technical potential is the second condition for switching. There are 
two types of switching; inside a power system and cross-border switching. It’s interest-
ing that countries with adequately varied power system, such as with many coal and 
gas-fired plants, can switch locally. Cross-border switching is a shift in electricity gen-
eration from a country with a carbon-intensive generation mix to a country with a 
generation mix with lower carbon intensity [5]. 
The next figure shows the historical EUA price from January 1st 2005 till March 31st 
2007 and the switching level of a 52% efficient gas-fired plant and a 38% efficient coal-
fired plant. As regard the natural gas, the UK NBO day ahead price is used and respec-
tively for coal the API#2 coal price. 
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Figure 2.17: Historic EUA prices (2005-2007), along with switch level of a 52% efficient gas-
fired plant and a 38% efficient coal-fired plant [5]. 
From Figure 2.17 we can have a picture when fuel switching could be applied. Par-
ticularly on the summer of 2005, EUA prices were high enough to support switching 
from coal to gas. The proofs for the switching in the summer of 2005 can be found in 
Figure 2.18. 
 
Figure 2.18: Distribution of coal- and gas-fire electricity generation in UK by month [5]. 
We can conclude that gas becomes popular every summer due to the fact that is 
cheapest. Switch was bigger in summer 2005 because of the highest CO2 price than in 
summer 2006 on which switching level was close to the carbon price and therefore the 
switch was smaller. During these two summers, the overall primary energy use re-
mained fairly stable, the use of coal in electricity generation increased by 10.8% from 
2005 to 2006, while the use of gas dropped 7.7% (Department of Trade and Industry 
2006); verifying the switching. 
Another evidence of switching can be found in the cross-border switch be-
tween Germany and Netherlands. UCTE (Union for the Coordination of the Trans-
mission of Electricity) data present an increase in cross border electricity flow from 
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Germany to Netherlands during 2005-2006. This indicates a shift in electricity gen-
eration from the first to the second country. Germany with more coal- and lignite-
fired power plants has higher carbon intensity than Netherlands, in which gas-fired 
power plants constitutes the majority. 
The current study except the empirical data used also a model which is called E-
simulate and has been evolved at the University of Leuven. Te model defines the fol-
lowing: a) electricity generation in a group of mutually connected group of zones b) on 
a power plant standard and c) in hourly rank. Also a complete competition is presumed 
inside every zone and as regard the cross-border trade. The model has enough power 
to execute big-range simulations and takes into consideration the cross-border trans-
mission capacity limits. 
The zones that are used in the model are shown in the following table: 
Table 2.1: Synthesis of the different zones that are used in the model [5]. 
Zone Countries 
1  United Kingdom (UK), Ireland (IRL)  
2  Spain (ES), Portugal (PT)  
3  Belgium (BE), the Netherlands (NL), Luxembourg (LU)  
4  France (FR)  
5  Italy (IT)  
6  Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Sweden (SE), Norway (NO)  
7  Poland (PL)  
8  the Czech Republic (CZ), the Slovak Republic (SK), Hungary 
(HU), Slovenia (SL)  
9  Austria (AT), Switzerland (CH)  
10  Germany (DE) 
 
There have been made exemptions in the countries that took part in the simula-
tion. Therefore, Switzerland despite the fact that is not a member state of EU, neither 
its industry is included in EU ETS; it is calculated since it plays a significant role in the 
electricity transmission inside Europe. Also some other countries because of their size 
they stayed out of the model calculations. The model simulated both first and second 
trading period. For the first one, years 2005 and 2006 examined and for each one two 
scenarios are estimated, one with real EUA market prices and one with none GHG 
emission expense. 
The outcome of the simulation is shown in Table 2.1 which demonstrates the shift 
in electricity generation for each zone and the GHG emission abatement separately for 
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2005 and 2006. It is obvious that the total emission reduction is bigger in the first year 
of the trading period, when the ETS was just been applied.  
The simulation proved what has been reported earlier and specifically the two ex-
amples about the switching in the summer of 2005. Paradigm 1 referred about UK 
which is included in the first zone on Table 2.1 and for both years the electricity gener-
ation remains stable. At the same time, the GHG emission abatement is significant 
greater in 2005 compare to 2006, which means that an internal coal to gas switch oc-
curred. 
The other paradigm was speaking about the cross border switch between Germany 
and Netherlands. Netherlands belong to zone 3 in which the electricity generation is 
greater in first year and in Germany (zone 10) the electricity generation decreased 
more in 2005 as compared to 2006. This means that Netherlands decreased import 
from German electricity in 2005. Electricity generation from Germany is considered 
“dirtier” than Dutch electricity which is less carbon intensive and this explains the cross 
border switch. The swift can be also recognized in the important decrease of GHG 
emissions in 2005, in Germany. 
Table 2.2: Simulation results in electricity generation and GHG emission reduction in 2005 and 
2006. A negative shift in electricity generation implies that because of EU ETS, countries that 
belong to this zone generated less electricity in contrast with the scenario where none carbon 
market exists. The opposite case can also be implemented [5]. 
 Countries Shift in electricity genera-
tion [TWhe/a] 
GHG emission reduction  
[Mton/a]  
  2005 2006 2005 2006 
1 UK+IRL  0.1  0.1  22.2  9.3  
2 ES+PT  -1.0  -1.0  6.4  3.8  
3 BE+NL+LU  2.8  0.6  2.6  1.4  
4 FR  21.5  20.8  2.6  2.1  
5 IT  1.4  1.3  7.3  3.2  
6 DK+FI+SE+NO  0.8  0.3  1.1  0.9  
7 PL  -8.0  -7.9  8.8  8.8  
8 CZ+SK+HU+SL  4.7  5.1  1.3  1.2  
9 AT+CH  0.0  -0.1  0.4  0.4  
10 DE  -22.3  -19.3  35.3  27.4  
total    88.0  58.6  
 
The model made also simulation about the second trading period using EUA prices 
starting from 0 to 200 €/tCO2. In Figure 2.19 is illustrated the monthly GHG emission 
abatement, compared to the initial scenario with zero CO2 value. The meaningful out-
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come is the important potential abatement in the summer due to the cheap gas prices 
and the low efficient coal plants compared to the high efficient gas plants. On the oth-
er hand, during winter the switching is restricted excluding EUA prices higher than 120 
€/tCO2 where GHG emission abatement remains almost the same all year. 
 
Figure 2.19: Monthly GHG emission abatement compared to the initial scenario with zero CO2 
value for different EUA prices (in *€/tCO2]) [5]. 
The upshots from the simulation tool E-Simulate showed that emission allowances 
play an important role in the fight against the GHG emission within the EU power sec-
tor. In the absence of carbon price, the GHG emission would have been 88 Mton high-
er in 2005 and 59 Mton in 2006. In the second trading period the simulation showed 
that a EUA price around 20 €/tCO2, can initiate 100MtonCO2 emission reduction per 
year via switching in electricity generation field. The maximum abatement is achieved 
when the EUA prices reach 150 to 200 €/tCO2. 
Kara, M., S. Syri, S. Helynen, V. Kekkonen, M. Ruska and J. Forsström (2008) 
In addition, paper [9] evaluates the impacts of EU CO2 emissions trading on the 
Nordic electricity market. The model that was used to study the average impact of EU 
ETS on electricity prices in Finland was the VTT electricity market model. This is an es-
sential model dependent upon physical demand and production of electricity in a mar-
ket region and the trade between connected areas. The model aims to balance the 
generation of electricity among power sources as thermal power and hydropower 
generation, in order to minimize generation costs. 
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The analysis shows that EU ETS has an increasing effect on the electricity genera-
tion costs of whole of production modes with carbon emissions. To make this clearer, 
in the Nordic electricity market, the medium cost increase with coal condensing power 
is approximately 0.9€/MWh for each 1€/tCO2. Similarly CO2 emissions had as an effect 
to increase for about 0.74€/MWh for every 1€/tCO2 in the Nordic region (Koljonen et 
al., 2004). 
In relation to the situation in the first trading period (2005-2007) it had insignifi-
cant impacts on the electricity prices as a consequence of the plenty emission allow-
ances that the member states allocated. However, in the second trading period (2008-
2012), the situation will probably change notably. The appliance of Kyoto protocol and 
EU boundaries, will lead to the need for more CO2 reductions in most countries. Con-
sequently, the allocations of CO2 allowances will be substantially less comparing to the 
first period and carbon prices will become higher. A major role for this will probably 
have the Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism and how they will 
evolve. 
In the same paper has been assessed to be more possible that the price of carbon 
certificates will vary from 10 to 20€/tCO2 throughout 2008-2012 and particularly 
among the lower prices. Numerous analysis supports these estimations (ECON analysis 
AB, 2004; Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, 2004; ILEX, 2004). 
CO2 allowances cause price of electricity generation to increase which triggers the 
creation of windfall profits for generators. It is estimated that in the Nordic electricity 
market important windfall profits will arise in hydropower and nuclear power sector. 
For paradigm, supposing a 10€/tCO2 price for carbon certificates and taking as granted 
a full pass-through of the marginal cost, it comes out that the extra annual financial 
gains for Norwegian and Swedish nuclear and hydropower generation, would be about 
1.7 billion €. 
Concerning Finland, the expected yearly windfall profits will be probably around 
480-630 million € presuming a 10€/tCO2 carbon allowance price and that all the pro-
duced electricity would be sold. Also, it depends from how many free emission allow-
ances will be allocated. 
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Figure 2.20: Formation of electricity price with CO2 emission trading [9]. 
The above figure presents the electricity price with and without emission trading. 
The area between the striped lines shows the increase in the electricity price induced 
by EU ETS. Actual, not all the emission allowances will be bought at market price; how-
ever electricity price with all production types will grow adjusted to the marginal in-
crease. 
A drawback of the current system is that has very short periods which multiply the 
risk connected to the investment decisions. The latter in Finland became obvious in the 
first trading period, since market players hesitate to proceed in investment decisions 
for CO2 abatement. For instance, higher use of bioenergy may be postponed because 
of the uncertainties of the following trading period specifications. All these uncertain-
ties will very likely promote capital transfers outside the EU and from old to new EU 
countries. As well as, electricity imports and purchases of carbon certificates to the old 
EU countries will probably be made in greater extent.  
Furthermore, as a consequence of the already carbon reduction measures taken 
throughout the pilot period the amount of the free allowances in the second period 
will decrease and the risk will climb. All in all, there is a significant risk that the EU ETS 
will result high energy costs to consumers and at the same time no major investments 
in low-emission technology will take place. 
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The windfall mechanism in the ETS has major impact especially to small-scale con-
sumer groups. To protect the consumers from the increase of the prices, the following 
steps have to been followed: guarantee 1) the investments in low-emission technolo-
gy, 2) the judicial and high competition at the electricity market, 3) the successive and 
adequate investments in technology development and finally 4) the national energy 
taxation model and the support system need to be revised. 
Reinaud, J. (2004) 
Article [7] elaborates the industrial competiveness in the EU ETS and specifically 
the ability of the industry to pass the CO2 cost, which comes from the ETS, to product 
prices. 
The big power plants use every day mixed integer linear programming (MILP) com-
puter programs to find the optimum solution on how to operate the power plants with 
the minimum cost. Electricity generators optimize their production portfolio by run-
ning their plants according to their marginal costs (Eurelectric). The earnings of an 
electricity generator depend mainly on the wholesale market where prices are settled 
by two factors; the wholesale power demand and the industry’s short-run marginal 
costs. When a power plant is not able to cover its augmentative costs containing the 
cost of the CO2 certificates, is better to stop production and sell the remaining certifi-
cates.  
The decision to pass-on the full opportunity cost of CO2 certificates or just part of it 
hinge on the following factors: 1) the type of the power market and how it works and 
2) the contract between generator and its customers, including the energy-intensive 
users in a liberalized market. 
One type of markets is the markets with dispatch priority and system balancing 
which is based on the Scandinavian NordPool model. These markets are more compet-
itive and demanding than the mandatory pools and this is accomplished by the re-
quirement of having won a physical contract in order to be dispatched (World Energy 
Council). Moreover, these contracts give to generators the choice to dispatch for a 
long time period and make them to offer cost-plus prices.  
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The other model is the markets with bilateral trading in which the generators have 
to sustain antagonistic prices, so that their share of the wholesale market remain the 
same. The only CO2 emission costs generators would pass onto their prices are the 
ones resulting from the purchase of allowances and abatement expenditures (Reinaud, 
2003). 
On the political side of view, some governments have strict regulation on increas-
ing power prices that come from emission allowances. For instance, in July 2004 gov-
ernment of Spain did not give permission to the new increased tariffs to pay back the 
cost of carbon certificates. 
The paper [7] includes also a sensitivity analysis examines the indirect impact of 
the EU ETS on the basis of various CO2 prices and different passing-on ranges. In Figure 
2.21 is shown a hypothetical merit order taking into consideration the European in-
stalled capacity, facilities etc. 
 
Figure 2.21: Merit order and impact of a 15€/tCO2 carbon price [7]. 
Marginal cost for hydro, wind and nuclear installations remains constant due to the 
fact that they are carbon-free. In the same figure, assuming a power demand at 255 
GW, the merit order and a full pass on their carbon cost to their wholesale prices (Fig-
ure 2.22), the set carbon price is 15€/tCO2 and the resulted weighted average carbon 
cost on the market is 7.5€/MWh. In other words, this means a 16% augmentation. 
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In the next table is presented a variety of carbon prices and how much they influ-
ence electricity prices. 
Table 2.3: Increase in wholesale power prices in Europe assuming full opportunity cost [7]. 
 
 
Figure 2.22 demonstrate the differences in power price growth following varying 
passing-on ranges of the opportunity cost connected with carbon. Furthermore, when 
the carbon price is close to 10€/tCO2, there is an increase of 3 to 5 per cent in the elec-
tricity price for a 50 to 100 per cent pass-through of the opportunity cost passing on. 
 
 
Figure 2.22: Increase in power prices following different carbon prices and passing-on ranges 
[7]. 
The analysis turn out that EU ETS has low probability to create important negative 
impacts in the near future and that the power of the industry to transfer the additional 
carbon cost to the end customers is critical. For now, electricity sector seems to be the 
only one to reflect part o the opportunity cost of having CO2 certificates. 
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2.2 Summary and Conclusions 
2.2.1 Review Studies and Studies Using Empirical Data 
The two review studies considered in this chapter (published in 2010 and 2009), 
examined the impact of the EU ETS in the electricity market and in other markets such 
as the (global) carbon and renewable markets. Both papers have concluded that: 
 Free allowance allocation had as a consequence negative results (for example 
various distortions occurred, such as the creation of windfall profits) and the 
best method of allowances allocation is auctioning which is more fair and effi-
cient. 
 In the short term, EU ETS will increase the short marginal cost and change the 
merit order dispatching in the electricity market. 
 In the long term, EU ETS will require power plant operators to focus in low 
emission technology (e.g. renewable energy production) and will induce in-
vestments on new capacities in behalf of power facilities at modest permit 
rates. 
Three fairly recent papers (published in 2009-2010) using empirical data, were re-
viewed and extensively presented in this chapter. Both studies have shown that: 
 The wholesale electricity prices have increased after the EU ETS came into force 
in the beginning of 2005. In May 2006 after the publication of the verified 
Emissions levels, carbon prices dropped suddenly because of the important 
over-allocation of emissions allowances and the loose emissions cap policy. The 
parallel decrease of the European Power Forwards Base prices in every country 
supports the fact that carbon price became indeed a common driver of whole-
sale power prices. Countries, such as Scandinavia, which have lower emissions 
factor in the grid, are actually importing the higher power prices. On the other 
hand, countries importing less carbon intensive power from other countries are 
actually benefiting from the cleaner power, such as Italy which imports large 
quantities of power from France. Altogether, emission trading scheme had as a 
consequence the convergence of European power markets [3]. 
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 Increased power prices gave rise to carbon leakage, something which is out of 
the purposes of the scheme. Thus, industries shift their productions away to 
regions which don’t have the carbon constraints of Europe. 
 On the contrary, the retail prices were only insignificantly influenced by the 
price of CO2. However, the state contributes much more in the rise of the price 
through several new fees and tax ascendants. For example, in Germany the 
state contributes (38.4% in total) with the following taxes: electricity tax (eco-
logical tax), renewable energy sources act, combined heat and power act, con-
cession levy and sales tax. 
 The EUA prices at the beginning of the system exhibited intense volatility. The 
price drivers that caused this volatility are the following: institutional factors 
(such as over-allocation in the first trading period), economic activity (includes 
the volume index of production of the following sectors: pulp and paper, ce-
ment, total industry, glass-bricks-tiles-ceramics, iron and steel, production and 
distribution of electricity), fuel prices and last but not least, weather conditions. 
 Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) use should be constrained in order a) to 
limit design inefficiencies that have affected the price path of EUAs during the 
first period of ETS (2005-2007) and b) to promote investments in low-carbon 
technologies inside the EU. 
An overview of the studies and the highlights are presented in the next table. 
Table 2.4: Overview of studies using empirical data 
Study Countries Period Highlights 
Claudia Kettner 
(2010) 
EU 2005-2008  Over-allocation of emissions allowances 
and the loose emissions cap policy 
caused the collapse of carbon prices in 
2006. 
 In 2008 the price volatility continued to 
be high. 
 Volatility caused by: 
1) institutional factors  
2) economic activity 
3) fuel prices 
4) weather conditions 
Julien Chevallier 
(2010) 
EU focus on 
2007-2009 
 CERs use should be constrained in order 
to limit design inefficiencies and pro-
mote low-carbon technologies inside 
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the EU. 
Ralf Wagner 
(2009) 
Germany UK 
Scandinavia 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
France 
Spain 
 
2004-2009  ETS increased wholesale power prices. 
 Carbon became a common driver of 
wholesale power prices. 
 ETS had as a result the convergence of 
European power markets. 
 Carbon leakage rose. 
 Retail prices have not been influenced 
much from carbon prices. 
 
2.2.2 Modeling Studies 
A number of models have been employed in the analysis of the impact of the EU 
ETS and particularly the impacts of CO2 prices. 
Djamel Kirat (2011) model results show that the EU ETS affected electricity prices 
and so the power sector in Germany and France, although in different extend. In the 
first trading period the scheme did not have big success and forced electricity produc-
ers to minimize their CO2 emissions and target in cleaner technologies. This ineffec-
tiveness caused because of two main reasons: 1) countries considers power plants 
strategic installations and 2) due to some mechanisms of the EU ETS such as the prohi-
bition of “banking” surplus emission allowances from one trading period to another. 
Consequently, carbon spot price collapsed in the end of the first trading period. 
Pahlea (2011) emphasizes that free allocation of ETS certificates produced windfall 
profits which had a really significant impact for “dash for coal” in Germany. According 
to the results, full auctioning would have impressively reduced the coal earnings and 
on the other hand, the single best available technology benchmark (SBAT) would have 
expanded the profitability of coal and gas schemes because of the windfall financial 
gains. The report supports that carbon prices influence in great extend the AUC and 
SBAT regimes. Additionally, the German NAP I was not responsible for “dash for coal”, 
but stimulated and supported it. Situation from 2013 and on when full auctioning will 
apply, Germany and EU will give the properly signals to the market from the environ-
mental point of view. Although as mentioned in another study, the numerous new 
hard coal generation plants that are scheduled for the future, extinguish the ambitions 
for low carbon emissions. 
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Chappin (2009) notice that the EU ETS is not sufficient enough to cause a signifi-
cant level of fuel shift. Coal because is cheap and flexible, such as there is a choice of 
co-fire biomass and store and capture of carbon emissions in the future; and due to 
the expansion of electricity needed, in the long-run it will not be abandoned. Moreo-
ver, the scheduled power plants for the next years in all Europe are very many and if 
someone considers the long lifetime of every installation, is clear that is not expected 
any change in the current situation in which coal is a very favorable energy fuel. 
Delarue (2008) argue that in the beginning of the EU ETS the price of allowances 
caused emission abatement through fuel switching in Europe. Note that two condi-
tions must exist for switching to take place; the first one is the economic motive and 
the second is the existence of technical potential. An important outcome is the signifi-
cant potential abatement in the summer due to the cheap gas prices and the low effi-
cient coal plants compared to the high efficient gas plants. During winter, the switch-
ing is restricted excluding EUA prices higher than 120€/tCO2 where GHG emission 
abatement remains almost the same all year. The simulations showed that emission 
allowances play an important role in the fight against the GHG emission within the EU 
power sector. In the absence of carbon price, the GHG emission would have been 88 
Mton higher in 2005 and 59 Mton in 2006. Furthermore, assuming a EUA price around 
20€/tCO2 in the second trading period, can initiate 100Mton CO2 emission reduction 
per year via switching in electricity power generation. 
Kara (2008) show that CO2 allowances cause the price of electricity generation to 
increase which in turn triggers the creation of windfall profits for generators. In the 
Nordic electricity market important windfall profits will arise in hydropower and nucle-
ar power sector. It has to be mentioned that in the Nordic countries (Finland, Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark) more than 70% of all electricity production is carbon-free, con-
sisting of mainly hydropower and nuclear power. The study estimated that the yearly 
average electricity price in the Nordic region increase by 0.74€/MWh for every 1€/tCO2 
allowance costs. The windfall mechanism in the ETS has major impact especially to 
small-scale consumer groups. To protect the consumers from the increase of the pric-
es, the following steps have to been followed: guarantee 1) the investments in low-
emission technology, 2) the judicial and high competition at the electricity market, 3) 
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the successive and adequate investments in technology development and finally 4) the 
national energy taxation model and the support system need to be revised. 
Reinaud (2004) estimated that a price of 15€/tCO2 would result a weighted average 
carbon cost on the market of 7.5€/MWh which means a 16% increase. The analysis 
concludes that the EU ETS has low probability to create important negative impacts in 
the near future and that the power of the industry to transfer the additional carbon 
cost to the end customers is critical. Till now, electricity sector seems to be the only 
one to reflect part of the opportunity cost of having CO2 certificates. 
An overview of the modeling studies and the highlights are presented in the follow-
ing table. 
Table 2.5: Overview of modeling studies 
Study 
 
Country/ 
Area 
Model Highlights 
Djamel Kirat 
(2011) 
France 
Germany 
empirical 
time-series, 
Dynamic 
model 
 EU ETS affected electricity prices and so the 
power sector in Germany and France 
 Because power plants are considered for 
each country as strategic installations and 
due to some mechanisms of EU ETS, the 
carbon spot price collapsed in the end of 
the first trading period. 
Pahlea (2011) Germany discounted 
cash flow 
 Free allocation of ETS certificates produced 
windfall profits. 
 AUC would have impressively reduced the 
coal earnings and SBAT would have ex-
panded the profitability of coal and gas 
schemes because of the windfall financial 
gains. 
 Carbon prices influence in great extend the 
AUC and SBAT regimes. 
 After 2013 that AUC will apply, EU will give 
the properly signals to the market. 
 The numerous new hard coal generation 
plants that are scheduled for the future, ex-
tinguish the ambitions for low carbon emis-
sions. 
Chappin (2009)     Netherlands agent-based 
simulation 
 EU ETS is not sufficient enough to cause a 
significant level of fuel shift. 
 Coal because is cheap and flexible and due 
to the expansion of electricity needed, in 
the long-run it will not be abandoned. 
 There are many new coal-fired plants pro-
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grammed and therefore is not expected any 
change in the current situation in which 
coal is a very favorable energy fuel. 
Delarue (2008) EU E-simulate, 
developed  
at the Uni-
versity of 
Leuven 
 In the beginning of the EU ETS the price of 
allowances caused emission abatement 
through fuel switching. 
 There is significant potential abatement 
during the summer due to the cheap gas 
prices and the low efficient coal plants 
compared to the high efficient gas plants. 
 Emission allowances play an important role 
in the fight against the GHG emission within 
the EU power sector. 
 In the absence of carbon price, the GHG 
emission would have been 88 Mton higher 
in 2005 and 59 Mton in 2006. 
Kara (2008) Finland VTT electric-
ity market 
model 
 CO2 allowances created windfall profits for 
generators. 
 The yearly average electricity price in the 
Nordic region increased by 0.74€/MWh for 
every 1€/tCO2 allowance costs. 
 For consumers’ protection by the increase 
of the prices, the following steps have to 
been followed: guarantee 1) investments in 
low-emission technology 2) the judicial and 
high competition at the electricity market 
3) the successive and adequate invest-
ments in technology development and fi-
nally 4) the national energy taxation model 
and the support system need to be revised. 
Reinaud (2004) EU sector simu-
lation model 
 A price of 15€/tCO2 would result a 
weighted average carbon cost on the mar-
ket of 7.5€/MWh which means a 16% in-
crease. 
 
-50- 
3 Liberalization of the European 
electricity sector 
This chapter addresses the liberalization process in the European electricity sector 
and discusses issues related the competitiveness and the EU ETS. In addition, the liber-
alization of the electricity market is in interaction with the EU ETS and competitiveness 
which is affected by the emissions trading scheme. 
3.1 Liberalization of the energy market 
The liberalization process in the European electricity sector started with Directive 
96/92/EC which is called “First Electricity Directive”. Through this directive, big electric-
ity consumers could eventually select their suppliers on the basis of a clear and impar-
tial network access. It also forced vertically integrated firms to provide third parties 
access to their transmission and distribution network. In general, the directive set up 
ordinary rules regarding generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. It de-
termined the rules how the electricity sector is organized, subjects with relation to ac-
cess in the market and what are the prerequisites and process practicable to calls for 
tenders. Furthermore, the Directive initiated the differentiation between a regulated 
section of the market which is the network and antagonistic sections of the market 
which are the generation and supply [50]. 
However, the First Electricity Directive didn’t have the expected results, since it 
caused important discrepancies between Member States with relation to the degree of 
market opening. Moreover, other barriers occurred associated with access to network, 
tariffication matters, the restricted level of unbundling obligations and the absence 
of commitment to adopt national energy regulator. Because of all these obstacles after 
some years became obvious that full market liberalization is required to be accompa-
nied with higher level of unbundling and obligatory network service regulation. The 
establishing of Directive 2003/54/EC which is called “Second Electricity Directive” and 
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Regulation 1228/2003 which is called “Cross Border Electricity Trading Regulation”, 
followed [50]. 
Directive 2003/54/EC replaced with a new Electricity Directive, the Directive 
2009/72/EC (called as “Third Electricity Directive”), which intends to institute common 
rules for the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity. In addi-
tion, it determines universal service obligations, the rights of electricity consumers, as 
well as the clarification of competitive requirements. Member States shall bring into 
force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this 
Directive by 3 March 2011. 
The main features of the new Directive are the following (Miklós Brázai, KPMG, 
2009): 
1. New unbundling regime - three “equal” options for transmission: 
a. ownership unbundling 
b. independent system operator (ISO) 
c. independent transmission operator (ITO) 
2. Improving the functioning of the internal electricity and gas market 
3. Establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER) 
4. Enhanced powers and independence of national regulators 
5. Efficient cooperation between TSOs 
6. Measures to reinforce security of supply 
The new Directive gave the chance to the consumers to be properly informed 
about the electricity market. The Member States are now forced to specify the actions 
which will protect the consumers and encourage the economic and social coherence. 
According to the legislation, all consumers can choose to purchase electricity or gas 
from various suppliers through the current networks as also through direct lines. Addi-
tionally, it brings forward many preconditions for power and gas firms and separate 
rules for supply, transmission and distribution firms (International Network for Sus-
tainable Energy, www.inforse.dk). 
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3.2 Situation in Member States 
This section discusses the progress made in the liberalization of the electricity mar-
kets in selected Member States [51]. 
Most observers regard the extent of that competition in German electricity market 
inadequate, and the outcome of liberalization quite discouraging. Unexpectedly in the 
beginning of the liberalization process and after 1998, competition level was high and 
as a result electricity prices fell during 1998-2000 for household and industrial con-
sumers; with the biggest decreasing in the latter. Due to these high price reductions, 
electricity generators had losses because they could not manage their position as they 
were not ready to deal with a liberalized market. 
United Kingdom is considered to have the most antagonistic electricity and gas 
market in Europe. The first gas and electricity markets liberalized in Europe were the 
English and the Welsh. Monopolies in gas, electricity generation and electricity supply 
were broken up. Therefore UK had taken more dynamic measures than those commit-
ted in the majority of the other Member States. 
In Italy, as in other countries, major contrasts regarding the market shares exist be-
tween the regulated and the free market. For example, in year 2008 64% of electricity 
was supplied on the liberalized market. Tendency towards a greater share of consump-
tion served by the free market should continue. Also, the most customers with small 
consumption are under regulated tariffs. The market liberalized fully on 1st July 2007 
and since that moment, all customers taking into account households can select their 
supplier and switch to the free market. 
Furthermore, in Spain can be found in the market regulated and liberalized prices 
together. About 1.3 million electricity consumers in Spain benefit from the liberalized 
market and the rest, which are approximately 22.7 million, may shift whenever they 
wish. It should be noted that between 2005 and 2007 an important number of cus-
tomers switched to regulated market because liberalized tariffs were higher. This indi-
cates the market misrepresentation, since the regulated tariffs are under production 
costs. During summer of 2007, the Spanish and Portuguese electricity market integrat-
ed in the Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL) which is the second regional electricity 
market merging in Europe after NordPool. In long-term this new integrated market is 
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expected to promote antagonism in Spain but particularly in Portugal, where there is 
only one dominant player in generation and supply sector. 
The first regional electricity market that was merged is the Nordic which has a 
shared power exchange, the NordPool, and almost all areas operate like one synchro-
nized zone. The countries that belong to this market are Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden. The market is considered to be the most antagonistic in all Europe be-
cause of its regional merging, which has as a consequence a lower degree of market 
accumulation in comparison to other markets in Europe.  
One of the incentives to merge the electricity markets was the differences in ener-
gy mix between the four interconnected countries. A great benefit of the region is the 
complementarity, since it allows adjustment of fluctuations in renewables production 
because of meteorological factors. For example, when there is less hydropower pro-
duction in a dry year or less wind production when there is no wind. 
Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Roma-
nia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia) have very different en-
ergy markets and they are considered to be a particular category attributed to a large 
extent to the communist past of many of the countries in these regions. These coun-
tries have in general lower economic growth and energy consumption per capita. Sig-
nificant energy poverty forces politicians to take action and keep very low the regulat-
ed energy prices. Hence, the entrance of new investors is difficult and the antagonism 
does not develop sufficiently. This is evidenced by the complaints of several investors 
from abroad, that the price of electricity does not exceed the cost of production. If this 
situation continues, it will create essential difficulties, due to the underinvestment in 
new infrastructure in energy sector. 
3.3 Competitiveness in the European energy markets 
During the last twelve years there has been a great effort from the EU to enhance 
energy market liberalization. It can be implied from the current EU legal framework 
that the market both for household and non-household consumers should be entirely 
competitive something which in practice is far from being true. In the previous para-
graphs was described the situation of liberalization process in selected Member States 
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and showed that each country has made progress toward liberalization in different 
level. 
In theory, the competitiveness of a sector or company is defined as its ability to 
maintain profits and market share. A substantial increase in costs for a sector in one 
region (entailing loss in profits compared to international competitors) would affect an 
industry’s competitiveness (its ability to retain market shares) in different ways: en-
hanced competition from cheaper competitors on domestic and overseas markets and 
lower profits leading to lower capacity to invest and expand activities (International 
Energy Agency – IEA 2008). 
An intended effect of the EU ETS is the reflection of the GHG associated costs in 
the production costs of installations covered by the Directive. In so far as the extra 
costs of covering GHG emissions are passed-through and included in product prices, 
the EU ETS also increases costs on the demand side, including electricity-intensive in-
dustries. Because the EU ETS just covers installations located in Europe, such partial 
implementation of climate policy could result to competitiveness distortions for car-
bon-intensive and energy-intensive companies. For example, carbon leakage may be 
an issue for energy intensive industries which face international competition 
(Graichen, 2009). 
In the third phase of the ETS almost all the allowances will be auctioned. However, 
auctioning also implies a potential loss of competitiveness for industry as the costs for 
industry are higher under auctioning than under free allocation of the rights. Particu-
larly if countries all over the world do not make an international agreement in the near 
future, companies inside Europe will deal with higher costs which may harm their ex-
ports and promote import substitution from non-EU countries where carbon has no 
price. So, this situation means that carbon leakage could become true. Because of that, 
EC has proposed to exempt exposed sectors from auctioning, and allocating them 
rights on the basis of a benchmark [52]. 
According to several Commission reports, Directive 2003/54/EC accomplished its 
targets only to a minor extent and did not succeed to establish an antagonistic electric-
ity market inside EU. In the end of 2008, several EU countries still preserved regulated 
wholesale power markets, to which the full pass-through of carbon costs could not be 
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automatically adopted and regularly the wholesale power price perhaps did not rever-
berate the marginal cost of generation [39]. 
A European Communities competition enquiry in the electricity sector, published in 
January 2007, revealed some “serious malfunctions” in the market for industrial con-
sumers. For example, market concentration still reflected the “old” market structure, 
characterized by national or regional monopolies - usually dominated by vertical-
ly integrated companies - which controlled electricity prices in the wholesale market 
and blocked new entrants to the market. In the gas sector, “incumbents tended to 
control imports and/or domestic production” according to the Commission (EurActiv, 
2007). 
On account of these issues, the EC presented in 2007 a third package of sugges-
tions to improve the 2003 Directive which resulted in the adoption of Directive 
2009/72/EC. Before the adoption of this directive, some of the EU countries did not 
agree to certain targets, but European Commission demonstrated its willingness to 
promote the agenda of market liberalization. 
Therefore, the electricity liberalization in EU cannot be considered under any cir-
cumstances complete or indisputable. However, is obvious that European Commission 
is committed to encourage development of antagonism in European electricity mar-
kets. The belief of New Carbon Finance (www.newcarbonfinance.com), based on the 
economic theory and the readiness of the European Commission to promote the liber-
alization, is that in 2013 the European electricity markets are possible to be more an-
tagonistic than they were in 2008. This means that marginal price will be the archetype 
in whole Europe after entering in Phase III (2013-2020) of the EU ETS. This essential-
ly would mean that auctioning should have minor influence on wholesale electricity 
prices [39]. 
3.4 Conclusions 
The integrated EU energy legislation did not succeed yet to create an EU market 
which operates in a unified mode; in contrast its operation is restricted in sub markets. 
Moreover, the wholesale markets in the most cases are bilateral, however in almost all 
countries trading in the electricity market is set up. To unify all these markets the fol-
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lowing factors are needed: 1) harmonized operation of the regulated electrical power 
markets and 2) the Transmission System Operators is necessary to harmonize compen-
satory markets, which will result to a complete liberalization.  
In the end of 2008 several EU countries still preserved regulated wholesale power 
markets, to which the full pass-through of carbon costs could not be automatically 
adopted and regularly the wholesale power price perhaps did not reverberate the 
marginal cost of generation. Marginal price will be the archetype in whole Europe after 
entering in the third Phase of EU ETS. This essentially would mean that auctioning 
should have minor influence on wholesale electricity prices. Furthermore, because EU 
ETS just covers installations located in Europe, such partial implementation of climate 
policy could result to competitiveness distortions for carbon-intensive and energy-
intensive companies. Finally, full auctioning in the third phase also implies a potential 
loss of competitiveness for industry as the costs for industry are higher under auction-
ing than under free allocation of the rights. 
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4 Trading in energy market - Trad-
ing methods 
Carbon emissions rights and related products are traded on the market and this 
chapter analyzes the main trading methods which are used. 
Nowadays, having in mind the running process of full liberalization, two main trad-
ing methods within wholesale market exists: 
1. Non Organized or Bilateral Trading which is usually referred as Over the Coun-
ter (OTC). In this trading everything is arranged between the interested parties 
without any intermediate, such as a clearing house and the contracts are not 
regulated. 
2. The second method is the Organized Trading, which is a structured system, or-
ganized in Power Exchanges or Power Pools and is operating according to its 
rules. 
In the figure below is presented a schematic structure of the electricity trading 
market in Europe. 
 
Figure 4.1: Electricity Trading Market in Europe [32] 
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A significant and obvious outcome of the liberalization procedure of the electricity 
industry is the progression of electricity trading and the establishment of electricity 
Power Exchanges. The liberalization process modified the European electricity industry 
by various methods, such as modifications in the regulatory framework and technical 
novelties which resulted in a meaningful change of the wholesale electricity market. 
Power Exchanges and Power Pools have some main differences. Power Pools come 
out of a public scheme and taking part is mandatory; in other words, the whole energy 
has to be traded on the pool. On the other hand, participation on the Power Exchanges 
is voluntary and exchanges are stimulated on privately basis. In Figure 4.2 and Table 
4.1 are shown analytically the existing Power Exchanges in all Europe. 
 
Figure 4.2: Map of Power Exchanges in Europe [32] 
Table 4.1: European Power Exchanges [32] 
Country Power Exchange Date 
Scandinavia Nord Pool 1993 
Spain Omel 1998 
Netherlands APX 1999 
Germany EEX 2000 
Poland TGE 2000 
Romania Opcom   2000 
France Powernext 2001 
Slovenia Borzen 2001 
United Kingdom UKPX 2001 
Austria EXXA 2002 
Czech Republic OTE 2002 
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Italy GME 2003 
Belgium Belpex 2005 
 
Every Power Exchange has identical targets which are: 
 promote electricity trade, 
 encourage antagonism, 
 guarantee transparency, 
 amplify liquidity and trustworthiness of its price index and 
 become recognized as a European marketplace [32]. 
In the following table are exhibited some main differences of OTC and power ex-
change trading method. 
Table 4.2: Bilateral Over-the-Counter vs. Power Exchange Trading [33] 
 
Properties 
Trading Method 
Over-the-Counter Power Exchange 
Anonymity of Trading No Yes 
Counterparty Bilateral Central Counterparty 
Counterparty Risk Yes, unless Cleared No 
Trading Method Continuous Trading Typically Central Auction 
 
Concerning bilateral contracts may be: 
 Customized 
o Flexible and respond to the requirements of the counterparties. 
o Reduce basis risk. 
o But requirements of the counterparties may not always be compatible 
and there is risk of creditworthiness between of them. 
 Standardized 
o Standard features and clauses. 
o Easier to negotiate. 
o Easier to trade in a secondary market. 
o But cost of negotiating and writing contracts is high [33]. 
Furthermore, because the electricity market in Europe is not uniformly divided 
among exchanges, OTC and bilateral contracts regarding volumes; every exchange in 
Europe has not the same significance in the market. In general, OTC appears to be the 
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dominant method of trading [34]. As regards the retail electricity activity, is overall free 
as every customer is able to choose his own supplier. 
To become more explicit that the OTC market is the one that is used most, we can 
refer to the increased of trading volume for power on the EEX which was 1273 TwH in 
2007 (or 12%), while in the OTC at the same period the trading volume was 2500 TwH. 
Table 4.3 shows the estimated total Euro-zone OTC power market size and value dur-
ing 2004-2007. Power market from 2004 to 2007 has increased 103% with estimated 
value €285 billion *34+. 
Table 4.3: Estimated total Euro-zone OTC Power Market Size and Value 2004-2007 [34] 
Euro Power Estimated size of market (GWh) Estimated value of market 
2007 6,336,909 (+103%)  €285 billion 
2006 3,126,841 (+24%)  €215 billion 
2005 2,524,470 (-12%)  €113 billion 
2004 2,878,796  €45   billion 
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5 Wholesale electricity market 
The previous chapter analyzed the trading methods within wholesale market that 
carbon emissions rights and related products are traded. In the present chapter, some 
important characteristics of wholesale electricity market are elaborated; such as ca-
pacity, generation, consumption, prices, convergence, the concentration in generation 
and are discussed some effects of the EU ETS. 
The most of the data was taken from ERGEG and the well-known Eurostat. The Eu-
ropean Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) was set up by the European 
Commission in 2003 as its advisory group on internal energy market issues. Its mem-
bers are the energy regulatory authorities of Europe. The work of the ERGEG is struc-
tured according to a number of working groups, composed of staff members of the 
national energy regulatory authorities. These working groups deal with different top-
ics, according to their members’ fields of expertise (ERGEG). 
5.1 The European electricity market – capacity, generation 
and consumption 
From 2008 to 2009 the total capacity in Europe rose roughly by 28 GW or 3.5% as 
the Figure 5.1 presents. 
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Figure 5.1: Generation capacity in 2008 and 2009 
Source: ERGEG 
The next figure presents electricity generation and consumption in EU, in year 
2009. In 2008 the numbers were higher which means that during the next year a re-
duction current appeared and particularly, generation fell by 4.0% and consumption by 
2.8%. The total reduction in consumption was approximately 12.0 TWh (3,160 TWh in 
total). The reduction was due to the economic crisis where in some countries was seri-
ous. 
 
Figure 5.2: Generation and consumption of electricity in 2009 
Source: ERGEG 
In the long term, the main effect of auctioning EUAs on the power sector compared 
to either no emissions trading or emissions trading with special free allocation provi-
sions to power plant closures and new entrants in the energy market; consist probably 
in the field of the magnitude and the kind of new investments in generation capacity. 
In contrast with auctioning or perfect free allocation, these provisions usually increase 
the magnitude of entire generation capacity. This is done by interfering or delaying the 
shutdown of dated, carbon intensive capacity or by speeding up investments in new 
capacity via reducing the long term marginal costs of these investments. Furthermore, 
when these free allocation provisions are accompanied by old fashioned technologies 
which are not carbon efficient, they further subvert even more the stimulus structure 
of the ETS concerning replacing dated, carbon inefficient generation capacity by new 
more carbon efficient investments. As a result, the introducing of full auctioning in 
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2013 (Phase III) will eliminate these unfavorable effects on the CO2 efficiency of the 
power generation capacity [42]. 
5.2 Wholesale electricity prices and convergence 
Due to the fact that OTC is the dominant method of trading in Europe, below are 
shown some more information about it. First of all, the average spot prices for Germa-
ny, France and Netherlands are listed in the following table, for years 2002 till 2007. 
The values presents the day ahead prices in €/MWh. 
Table 5.1: Average Spot Prices per year of European Power Markets (€/MWh) *34+ 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
German Spot 26,30 35,38 31,49 46,20 54,52 42,32 
French Spot 23,87 33,43 31,10 47,97 48,73 40,80 
Dutch Spot 43,31 58,67 38,06 94,39 no data 85,59 
 
The table reveals that the average German and French spot prices are moving to-
gether and therefore these markets show similar trends. The Dutch market has always 
higher prices due to the inadequate indigenous generation capacity and the physical 
obstacles to import inexpensive electricity from Germany [34]. Also, in general average 
prices are increasing every year except in 2007 where there was a decrease. 
The examination of German OTC prices and exchange prices during 2002 evidence 
that German power overall convergent almost all year long [34]. 
 
Figure 5.3: OTC versus exchange-based trading prices for German spot power in 2002 [34] 
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Additionally, convergence in prices is getting higher as time passes due to the ex-
pansion of market coupling and market unification. In Spain for example in the Iberian 
wholesale market convergence climbed in 2009 and specifically over 75% of the time, 
day-ahead spot prices in Spain was the same in Portugal. Another good example is the 
variation of wholesale electricity prices in Germany and in Nordic area. As shown in the 
figure bellow, prices of EEX/EPEX Spot and Nord Pool Spot converged between 2008 
and 2009 (ERGEG 2010). 
 
Figure 5.4: Price comparison between Power Exchange Nord Pool Spot and Power Exchange 
EEX / EPEX Spot (Phelix Base Day-Ahead), 2004 - 2009 (annual average) 
Source: ERGEG 
We can also observe that wholesale prices peaked in summer 2008 and the main 
reason was the high cost of fossil fuels and carbon allowances, followed by a sharp de-
cline in the second half. The wholesale prices were generally stable during 2009 (DECC, 
2011). 
In addition, the carbon system played its role for this convergence of European 
power markets via the introduction of a carbon pricing regime [3]. Another study 
states that market data suggests that there is growing convergence between German, 
Polish, Hungarian and Czech wholesale electricity prices, suggesting that more of the 
costs of carbon are already being incorporated into whole prices in all four countries 
[39]. 
Daily spot prices for power in France and Germany OTC day-ahead market during 
2002-2007 are presented in the next figure. Is obvious that in long term, German and 
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French market have similar price trends which mean that are highly correlated [34]. 
Conclusively, there is also growing convergence between German and French electrici-
ty prices, suggesting that more of the costs of carbon are already being incorporated 
into whole prices in these two countries. 
 
Figure 5.5: Daily spot prices for power in France and Germany 2002-2007 [34] 
5.3 Market dominance 
Enhanced antagonism is very important for the properly price determination and 
when a small number of generators rule the market and affect prices, this has negative 
results. Therefore, market concentration is a substantial factor which influences prices 
(ERGEG 2010). In 2009 there was a 1% reduction in market concentration in all Europe, 
or in other words, the three biggest generators average capacity percentage decreased 
from 76.0% to 75.4%. Summing the three biggest generators of every Member State, 
the outcome is 600,000 MW in a total capacity of 840,000 MW. The total share of the 
largest three generators in 2008 and 2009 is shown below. 
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Figure 5.6: Total share of the largest 3 generators in 2008 and 2009 
Source: ERGEG 
Another indicator of market concentration is the market share of the largest gen-
erator in the electricity market. Figure 5.7 shows the percentage of the largest genera-
tor for the Member States where the relative data was available. 
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Figure 5.7: Market % share of the largest generator in the electricity market for 2009 
Source: Eurostat 
Cyprus and Malta have only one generator with 100% market share in 2009; Croa-
tia, Greece and Estonia follows, in which the biggest generator has at least 90% share 
of the market. The biggest generator in thirteen countries has at minimum 50% share 
of the market and the lowest percentage among the 26 countries is detected in Poland 
(18.1%). 
From the above figures we understand that in all Europe the degree of concentra-
tion in generation it remains high, and this creates the opportunity for generators to 
occupy a dominant position on the market and take advantage of it, controlling the 
prices. Contrariwise, new investors in generation sector haven’t affected much the 
powerful position of incumbent operators. Other barriers for new entrants is the diffi-
culties in the licensing and designing procedures, the lack of appropriate sites and the 
existing of risk associated with the power exchanges. Generation is a very important 
factor for the proper functioning of competition in the European electricity markets 
[53]. 
The generators, having as an ally the characteristics of the electricity market, such 
as the non-storability of electricity and the lack of flexibility of demand; have the abil-
ity to control prices exploiting their generation capacity. The typical methods they do 
this is by withdrawing capacity or by enforcing prices when the market need them to 
satisfy demand [53]. 
5.4 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the generation capacity in EU shows an increase trend but at the 
same time production and consumption decreased in 2009. Additionally, in the current 
phase of the EU ETS there are provisions, which in contrast with auctioning or perfect 
free allocation; they usually increase the magnitude of entire generation capacity. This 
is done by interfering or delaying the shutdown of dated, carbon intensive capacity or 
by speeding up investments in new capacity via reducing the long term marginal costs 
of these investments. The introducing of full auctioning in 2013 (Phase III) will elimi-
nate these unfavorable effects on the CO2 efficiency of the power generation capacity. 
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 Furthermore, convergence in prices among markets is getting higher as time pass-
es due to the expansion of market coupling and market unification. In addition, the 
carbon system played its role for this convergence of European power markets via the 
introduction of a carbon pricing regime [3]. Another study states that market data sug-
gests that there is growing convergence between German, Polish, Hungarian and 
Czech wholesale electricity prices, suggesting that more of the costs of carbon are al-
ready being incorporated into whole prices in all four countries [39]. The same applies 
between German and French electricity prices. 
Finally, in Europe the degree of concentration in generation remains high and this 
creates the opportunity for generators to occupy a dominant position on the market 
and take advantage of it, controlling the prices. 
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6 Retail electricity market 
In this chapter some important characteristics of the retail electricity market are 
elaborated, such as the development of regulated and non-regulated electricity prices 
for end-users, the market structure and the switching rates. Also, is discussed the im-
pact of EU ETS on retail prices and why it is different from the impact on wholesale 
prices. 
6.1 Evolution of electricity prices for household and indus-
trial consumers 
Through analyzing the electricity price levels of households and industrial custom-
ers, is very clear the existence of huge variations. Figure 6.1 shows the composition of 
total electricity prices for households in the second half of 2009 with an annual con-
sumption between 2,500-5,000 kWh per year (consumer band Dc). In the top of the 
countries with the most expensive electricity for households is Denmark; Germany, 
Italy and Austria follows. On the other side, Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania had the 
lowest electricity prices. The maximum total price was 25.53 cent/kWh (Denmark) and 
the lowest 8.18 cent/kWh (Bulgaria). 
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Figure 6.1: Composition of total electricity prices for households in H2 2009 (Consumer band 
Dc; 2,500 - 5,000 kWh/year; Eurostat) 
Source: ERGEG 
Furthermore, for industrial consumers the situation is different. On the calculations 
has been taken into account industrial consumers that have yearly consumption be-
tween 500 and 2,000 MWh in consumer band Ic, during the second half of 2009. The 
largest price was found in Cyprus; Slovakia and Italy follows. On the other hand, Bul-
garia has the cheapest electricity price; Estonia and France coming next. The maximum 
total price was 14.94 cent/kWh (Cyprus) and the lowest 6.39 cent/kWh (Bulgaria). 
The fluctuation in prices derives from the fluctuations in the cost of generating 
electricity, combined with the deficient competition and merging in the European elec-
tricity market which creates barriers to export the electricity from low–cost countries 
to high–cost countries. In addition, variations in taxation have also an effect [41]. 
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The establishment of the European Emission Trading Scheme influences the abso-
lute and relative electricity prices. The average spot price till the end of 2009 and dur-
ing the second period of the ETS was about 16€/tCO2 and had only a minor impact on 
the average retail prices of electricity. However, the ETS generally has a different influ-
ence in energy prices among countries. This is because of the change in the exploit of 
energy sources across countries members, accompanied by the various CO2 intensities 
of these energy sources, since for example coal and lignite are very carbon intensive 
than the energy which comes from renewables or nuclear [41]. 
Comparing prices of the second half of 2008 and 2009 an extremely miscellaneous 
price evolution is detected. The electricity prices for households goes from minus 20% 
up to plus 21%, when for industrial consumers the corresponding percentages range 
from minus 20% to plus 12%. Having a closer look in the evolution of price compo-
nents, which are energy and supply, network costs, taxes and levies; we understand 
that price rises for households were led by growing prices in all components (energy 
and supply, network costs, taxes and levies). The same apply in countries where the 
price fell (ERGEG 2010). 
The first component, energy and supply, is set by wholesale electricity prices and 
retailer margins and is the only component which fluctuate in compliance with the 
wholesale price [54]. Carbon price is reflected in the energy and supply component. In 
the second half of 2009, this component was highest in Malta reaching 12.18 
cent/kWh and minimum in Romania with 3.14 cent/kWh. This important changing in 
prices is due to the various wholesale prices and retailer margins in each European 
country. Energy component can be controlled by enhancing antagonism on wholesale 
and retail markets [54]. 
The second component, network costs, has no big fluctuations like the energy and 
supply component and for 2009 h2 the highest cost was 7.45 cent/kWh in Lithuania 
and the lowest was found in Bulgaria (2.51 cent/kW). Because transmission and distri-
bution belong to the monopolistic sector, network costs for end-users, can be influ-
enced by providing functional and sufficient regulation [54]. Furthermore, we have to 
mention that network cost is an important part of the total electricity price, making 
difficult the price convergence. To overcome this barrier, network unbundling has to 
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be continued, together with substantive stimulus regulation of networks. The first fac-
tor will enhance competitive prices and the second will lead to improved efficien-
cy through techniques such as price caps (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). 
Finally, taxes and levies is the last component with extreme variation between EU 
Members. Usually, the countries with the highest energy prices for domestic consum-
ers have as well high Public Service Obligation tariff dues. Industries with large con-
sumption are generally not paying these extra charges. During the last years, taxes and 
levies have not changed much but in the future this situation may alter due to expan-
sions in green electricity fees [54]. In the second half of 2009, Denmark had the highest 
taxes and levies reaching 14.38 cent/kWh; the lowest detected in United Kingdom and 
were 0.68 cent/kWh. 
For industrial consumers, price developments were firstly caused by the altering in 
the energy component and secondly from the network costs. The third component, 
which is the taxes and levies, did not have considerable impact. 
In general, countries that regulate the prices were allocated throughout the all ex-
tent of household prices. A country with price regulation does not mean automatically 
low or high electricity prices. In 13 countries where price for households decreased, 10 
of them regulated the prices and 8 out of 14 countries that the price climbed had price 
regulation too. However, the seven countries with the lowest household prices; regu-
lated them. 
Figure 6.2 demonstrates the electricity prices from 2007 till 2010 for household 
consumers in the EU-27 and EA (Euro Area). In 2008 the prices went up, then during 
2009 remained stable or declined a bit; however in 2010 rose again. 
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Figure 6.2: Evolution of EU-27 and EA electricity prices for households’ consumers from 2007 
s2 till 2010 s2 
Source: Eurostat 
The evolution of electricity prices for industrial consumers is not exactly the same 
as for households. As the following figure shows, the prices rose in 2008 and through-
out the first semester of 2009; in the rest of the year 2009 declined but then climbed 
again in 2010. 
 
Figure 6.3: Evolution of EU-27 and EA electricity prices for industrial consumers from 2007 s2 
till 2010 s2 
Source: Eurostat 
In addition, two figures are following, exhibiting the percentage change in electrici-
ty prices for household and industrial consumers between the second semester of 
2009 and 2010. To the majority of the countries and specifically in twenty of them, 
electricity prices for households increased, in six declined and only in Latvia remained 
the same. The biggest electricity increase also for households, detected in Lithuania 
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(31%), Cyprus followed (23%) and then Greece with 17%. At the same time, electricity 
price in Netherlands decreased approximately by 8%, in Luxembourg 7% and in Italy 
4%. 
 
Figure 6.4: Percentage change in electricity prices for household consumers, 2010s2-2009s2 
Source: Eurostat 
The next figure shows the corresponding prices for industrial consumers. In four-
teen European countries the electricity prices increased and in eleven declined. Only in 
Finland the prices remained unchanged. The biggest electricity increase detected in 
Malta (39%), Lithuania followed (32%) and then Cyprus with 16%. At the same time, 
electricity price in Hungary decreased approximately by 16%, in Slovakia 15% and in 
Luxembourg 12%. 
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Figure 6.5: Percentage change in electricity prices for industrial consumers, 2010s2-2009s2 
Source: Eurostat 
6.2 Regulated electricity prices for end-users 
Nineteen countries in 2009 regulated household prices and sixteen countries for 
industrial consumers. Some countries during 2009 introduced price regulation and 
some others removed them, both in non-households and households electricity prices. 
In general terms, regulated end-user prices play an important role in the retail electric-
ity market as they cover a considerable share of the European countries (ERGEG 2010). 
In the countries with price regulation, more than 90% of households were supplied 
at regulated prices in 2009 (by number or volume), and in some cases reached 100%. 
Only in two countries the share was below 90%. In 2009 the portion of households (by 
number or volume) supplied at controlled electricity prices did not change significantly 
from 2008 and it was 57% (139 million households). Regarding non-household cus-
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tomers supplied at regulated prices (by volume) during 2009 was diverse and extend-
ing from 4% up to 100%. The industrial consumers with regulated prices, covered 
about the one sixth of the whole consumption of industrial consumers in Europe (EU-
27 and Norway) (ERGEG 2010). 
To understand what is the impact of EU ETS on end-user prices we have to concen-
trate more in retail market and prices from where the consumers buy the electricity. 
Generators may pass-through their cost of emission allowances to the wholesale pric-
es, but this does not mean that it will pass-thought also to the retail prices. 
There are many reasons for someone to expect that the impact of the ETS on the 
retail market and prices is smaller than in wholesale prices. As we mentioned above, 
more than the half of domestic consumers are supplied electricity in regulated prices 
and many regulators do not agree to pass through the extra cost, comes from CO2 al-
lowances. Furthermore, although industrial consumers with regulated prices cover on-
ly one sixth of the whole consumption of industrial consumers, in a number of Mem-
ber States they are able to switch to regulated tariffs and secure themselves from price 
raises (Levy, 2005). More information about switching rates is illustrated in the next 
paragraphs. 
Additionally, several non-household users negotiate the long-run agreements with 
suppliers and that specify the prices, which are connected to the wholesale markets, in 
a small extent but not completely. This is something which is expected to change over 
the years that the free market will develop more. However, even in a true free market, 
industrial customers have the ability to negotiate with retailers on how prices are de-
termined (Levy, 2005). 
European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) position’s paper (2007) 
declare that end-user price regulation in electricity (and gas) markets distorts the func-
tioning of the market and jeopardizes both security of supply and the efforts to fight 
climate change. Therefore, end-user price regulation should be abolished, or where 
appropriate, brought into line with market conditions. Furthermore, “vulnerable cus-
tomers” should still be protected; however, protecting “vulnerable customers” should 
not be confused with regulated tariffs for all (or certain categories) of customers 
(ERGEG 2007). 
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The reasons that end-user price regulation distorts the market according to ERGEG 
(2007) are the following: 
 If regulated end-user prices are not in line with wholesale market conditions 
(prices), suppliers without significant low cost generation capacities or equiva-
lent LTC will not be able to make competitive offers which cover their supply 
costs. As there are a limited number of suppliers, there will be no development 
of wholesale markets. As a result, neither the wholesale nor retail markets will 
be competitive. 
 Regulated prices limit customers’ possibilities and incentives for switching sup-
plier, hence limiting competition. If regulated prices give customers artificially 
low prices it removes the incentive to switch supplier. 
 The lack of competition on retail markets hampers the customers’ position. It is 
through exercising their right to choose, that customers stimulate retail compe-
tition between suppliers. Competitive pricing on the retail side is an important 
driver for market integration. 
Additionally, the European Community sector investigation emphasizes the con-
cern with regulated tariffs, indicating that if regulated tariffs are maintained low, new 
entrants are kept out from the market and market players will not invest in new capac-
ity, which is prejudicial to the security of supply (EC 2007). 
6.3 Market structure 
The market share of the three largest suppliers as regard the retail market is a sig-
nificant indicator of the degree of concentration, concerning in the supply. The situa-
tion in 2009 remained approximately the same. 
Moreover, in every country there are from one to six companies with at least 5% 
market share in the whole retail market for electricity. From, 2008 only minor varia-
tions occurred in some countries. As the following figure shows, the highest concentra-
tion is observed in seven countries in the entire retail market. Particularly they have 
one dominant supplier with a market share from 96% to 100%.  The three largest com-
panies in Norway have the lowest market share which is 36%. 
-78- 
 
Figure 6.6: Plot of market share of the three largest companies vs. number of companies with 
5% or more market share in the whole retail market in 2009 
Source: ERGEG 
6.4 Evolution of switching rates 
Another useful indicator is the switching of suppliers which implies that customers 
are conscious of the options that they have in an antagonistic supply market and ex-
ploit them. The existence of switching indicates the minor power of the companies and 
that antagonism works properly. On the other way, when switching is low, it can also 
suggest that competing offers are similar in the sense of tariffs and level of service, 
therefore customers do not have motives to switch supplier. 
The next figure shows the switching rates in the whole retail market for the years 
2008 and 2009. In nine countries the switching rates enlarged, in three countries de-
creased and in four countries did not change at all. Specifically, switching rates were 
zero for 2008-2009 in Cyprus, Malta, and Lithuania; and only for 2008 in Greece and 
Estonia. Portugal presented the highest switching rate in 2009 which was 47%. 
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Figure 6.7: Development of annual switching rates in the whole retail market in 2008 and 2009 
(by eligible volume) 
Source: ERGEG 
Concerning switching rates for non-household customers, there is data for fewer 
countries (Figure 6.8). Particularly, switching rates were zero for 2008-2009 in Cyprus, 
Malta, and Lithuania; and only for 2008 in Portugal. Furthermore, in six countries the 
rate increased and in five decreased. 
 
Figure 6.8: Development of annual switching rates for non-household customers in 2008 and 
2009 (by eligible volume) 
Source: ERGEG 
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Finally switching rates for households, increased in ten countries, but the remarka-
ble thing is that in another ten countries there was nearly no switching. The largest in-
crease is found in Ireland where the rate soared from 0.3% in 2008 to 20% in 2009. The 
rate of switching mainly depends on whether prices are regulated or not. So, when 
prices are regulated, switching rate stays really low, but when price regulation does 
not exists, it climbs. There are always some exceptions, like in Ireland where prices are 
regulated, although presented the highest switching rate. 
 
Figure 6.9: Development of annual switching rates for households in 2008 and 2009 (by num-
ber of eligible meter points) 
Source: ERGEG 
6.5 Conclusions 
Conclusively, the differences identified in the retail electricity market specifically in 
prices and switching behavior highlights the need for intensive reform towards Euro-
pean unification also in retail market. Additionally, having in mind that 50% of house-
hold customers in Europe are buying electricity at regulated prices, is obvious how in-
fluential is price regulation. 
Moreover, till the end of 2009 carbon allowances with average price 16€/tCO2 had 
only a minor impact on the average retail prices of electricity. ERGEG states that end-
user price regulation in electricity markets distorts the functioning of the market and 
jeopardizes both security of supply and the efforts to fight climate change and for the-
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se reasons should be abolished. Finally, EC stress that if regulated tariffs are main-
tained low, this is detrimental for the security of supply. 
In addition, generators may pass-through their cost of emission allowances to the 
wholesale prices, but this does not mean that it will pass-thought also to the retail 
prices. There are many reasons for someone to expect that the impact of the ETS on 
the retail market and prices is smaller than in wholesale prices. One reason is that 
about the half of domestic consumers are supplied electricity in regulated prices and 
many regulators do not agree to pass through the extra cost, comes from CO2 allow-
ances. Regarding industrial consumers with regulated prices, although they cover only 
one sixth of the whole consumption of industrial consumers, in a number of Member 
States they are able to switch to regulated tariffs and secure themselves from price 
raises. 
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7 Impact of the EU ETS and effec-
tiveness of price increases 
In the present chapter is exhibited the effectiveness of price increases due to EU 
ETS and some findings about the impact of EU ETS on energy sector investments. 
7.1 Effectiveness of price increases due to EU ETS 
Price increases caused by EU ETS are not sure that will be beneficial for the com-
munity. For example, generators might just pass through their extra cost to the market 
or take advantage of the windfall profits due to the extra allowances they get because 
of the overallocation. This scenario is more possible to happen till the end of the se-
cond period of the ETS because the most allowances comes from grandfathering. 
However, in the third period which starts on 2013 the most of the allowances will be 
auctioned and windfall profits are anticipated to decrease significantly. Another nega-
tive parameter of grandfathering is that producers have an influential motive to con-
ceal emission abatement investments from authorities, having in mind the number of 
allowances that it will be allocated to them. Then, through the operation of ETS they 
can sell the extra allowances on the market and get profit from nothing. 
It is widely accepted that distributing CO2 licenses through auctions is a more eco-
nomically and intelligent method comparing for example with grandfathering. Bidding 
will result in a real market price for certificates and minimize allowance overallocation. 
So, the price of allowances will be a true image of the market and consumers that will 
pay more will know that their money would probably go for CO2 emissions abatement 
investments. 
From 2013 and onwards that the auctions will be the main method of allocating al-
lowances, transfer of wealth will be mostly from the direction of polluters to authori-
ties and less in the opposite way. As a result, the effectiveness of the emission trading 
scheme will be upon the market power and not to the governments, something which 
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is considered as an advantage (European Academies Science Advisory Council – EA-
SAC). 
7.2 Impact of EU ETS on energy sector investments 
Numerous studies have been done regarding the impact of EU ETS on investments 
and have indicated that they are indeed influencing companies’ decision and enhance 
carbon abatement. The important issue is if the emissions trading scheme is able to 
influence the long run investment decisions. Some of the findings according to survey 
[43] are illustrated below. 
 In the end of 2009, many years after the initiating of the EU ETS in 2005, carbon 
prices seem to be completely integrated into investments decisions inside Eu-
rope. 
 The EU ETS is having unambiguous impact on 
o The addition of new biomass co-firing capacity. 
o Old and carbon intensive plants closed before the original schedule. 
o Investments in CSS, however the most important factor is the govern-
ment support. 
 Carbon price maybe is not adequate to explain a direct wholesale shift to more 
efficient carbon technologies but persuades generators to concentrate in lower 
carbon technologies, as an example CCGT and more efficient coal. 
 The EU ETS has been established as a factor when electricity generators are 
making investments decisions. 
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8 Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis examined the effect of the EU ETS on electricity wholesale and retail 
prices. A literature review on fairly recent publications examining the effects of the ETS 
(most published in between 2008-2011) revealed that: 
1. The effect of the EU ETS on electricity prices is not the same in all countries. 
Two main reasons, were that countries considers power plants strategic instal-
lations and due to some mechanisms of the EU ETS, such as the prohibition of 
“banking” surplus emission allowances from one trading period to another. 
2. Carbon prices became a common driver of wholesale prices and made them to 
increase, but at the same time carbon leakage rose too. 
3. Retail prices, are not influenced much from CO2. 
4. Contribution of the Member States is significant in the rise of retail prices and 
takes place through several new fees and tax ascendants. 
5. Price regulation should be abolished because in general regulation distorts the 
market. For example, if regulated tariffs are maintained low, new entrants are 
kept out from the market and market players will not invest in new capacity 
with advanced and carbon efficient technology. 
6. Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) use should be constrained. Thoughtless 
use would result to a price floor for EUAs and lead to lower prices. If CERs will 
be restricted, will limit design inefficiencies that have affected the price path of 
EUAs during the first period of the ETS and promote investments in low-carbon 
technologies inside the EU. 
7. Free carbon allowances created windfall profits for generators. These profits 
come from the extra allowances they get because of the overallocation through 
the processing of grandfathering. Full auctioning which is more fair and effi-
cient and will start after the end of the second phase; seems to be the solution 
to eliminate these profits which distort the function of the EU ETS. 
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8. Although the EU ETS provoked emissions abatement through fuel switching in 
Europe, is not sufficient enough to cause a significant level of fuel shift. This is 
due to the fact that coal is cheap and flexible, and the electricity capacity that 
will be needed in the future is huge. If in the above is added the numerous 
scheduled power plants for the next years in all Europe and the long lifetime of 
each installation; everyone can understand that in the long run coal will not be 
abandoned. 
The liberalization of the electricity markets and the EU efforts towards the creation 
of a single internal market, a continuous process since at least 1996 has to a grand ex-
tent modified the functioning of the power industry and has also affected prices.  As 
part of this work, selected electricity markets of certain EU Member States were re-
viewed. Furthermore, liberalization of the electricity market is in interaction with the 
EU ETS and competitiveness which is affected by the emissions trading scheme. Issues 
related to this interaction, has been examined. It was found that: 
1. The integrated EU energy legislation did not succeed yet to create an EU mar-
ket which operates in a unified mode; in contrast its operation is restricted in 
sub markets. To unify all these markets the following factors are needed: har-
monized operation of the regulated electrical power markets and the Transmis-
sion System Operators is necessary to harmonize compensatory markets, which 
will result to a complete liberalisation. 
2. In the third phase of the EU ETS, almost the whole of emission allowances will 
be auctioned. This will minimize the effects on wholesale electricity prices and 
help the liberalization process. 
3. In the end of 2008 several EU countries still preserved regulated wholesale 
power markets, to which the full pass-through of carbon costs could not be au-
tomatically adopted and regularly the wholesale power price perhaps did not 
reverberate the marginal cost of generation. 
4. Full auctioning in the third phase of the EU ETS, also implies a potential loss of 
competitiveness for industry as the costs for industry are higher under auction-
ing than under free allocation of the rights. 
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5. Because the EU ETS just covers installations located in Europe, such partial im-
plementation of climate policy could result to competitiveness distortions for 
carbon-intensive and energy-intensive companies. 
Finally, in an effort to shed additional light in the effect of the ETS system on elec-
tricity wholesale and retail prices, a hands-on analysis, based on ERGEG and Eurostat 
data was performed.  It was found that: 
1. In the current phase (II) of the EU ETS there are provisions, which in contrast 
with auctioning or perfect free allocation; they usually increase the magnitude 
of entire generation capacity. This is done by interfering or delaying the shut-
down of dated, carbon intensive capacity or by speeding up investments in new 
capacity via reducing the long term marginal costs of these investments. The in-
troducing of full auctioning in 2013 (Phase III) will eliminate these unfavorable 
effects on the CO2 efficiency of the power generation capacity. 
2. Convergence in prices among markets is getting higher as time passes due to 
the expansion of market coupling and market unification. In addition, the car-
bon system played its role for this convergence of European power markets via 
the introduction of a carbon pricing regime. The growing convergence also sug-
gests that more of the costs of carbon are already being incorporated into 
whole prices. 
3. The degree of concentration in generation in EU remains high and this creates 
the opportunity for generators to occupy a dominant position on the market 
and take advantage of it, controlling the prices. 
4. The differences identified in the retail electricity market specifically in prices 
and switching behavior highlights the need for intensive reform towards Euro-
pean unification also in retail market. 
5. More than 50% of household customers in Europe are buying electricity at reg-
ulated prices and many regulators do not want to pass the extra cost of emis-
sions allowances to the end-consumers. Additionally, the most of the industrial 
consumers have no regulated prices but can switch whenever they want. 
6. Till the end of 2009 carbon allowances with average price 16€/tCO2 had only a 
minor impact on the average retail prices of electricity. 
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The second period of the EU ETS ends on December 2012 and then the third period 
will begin, in which the most emission allowances will be auctioned. Furthermore, this 
period will last longer, and so will affect more the energy market. A new survey on the 
impact of emissions trading on electricity investments and prices, maybe in a more 
practical approach, could be done after the establishment of the third phase in 2013, 
to continue the work of this thesis. 
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Country codes 
Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Germany (DE), Estonia 
(EE), Ireland (IE), Greece (EL), Spain (ES), France (FR), Italy (IT), Cyprus (CY), Latvia (LV), 
Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Hungary (HU), Malta (MT), the Netherlands (NL), Aus-
tria (AT), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), Finland 
(FI), Sweden (SE), the United Kingdom (UK), Croatia (HR), Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (MK), Turkey (TR) and Norway (NO). 
